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VERTICAL AGREEMENTS UNDER SECTION 1 OF THE
SHERMAN ACT: RESULTS IN SEARCH OF REASONS
MARK D. ANDERSON*
The application of section 1 of the Sherman Act' to resale restrictions
imposed by a supplier of goods requires an'analysis of whether such restrictions
result from an agreement and, if so, the standard applicable to the restriction.
Each of these issues is a source of continuing controversy. The present position
of the United States Supreme Court on the agreement issue2 is a product of
two inappropriate influences. First, -the Court has attempted to accommodate
disparate interests reflected in the debate over the standards that should be
applied once an agreement is proven. Second, the Court has resurrected the
Colgate" doctrine, that was uncertain at its inception and has since been subject
to limitation and qualification. This paper argues that the agreement issue
should be resolved in light of the reason for the agreement requirement. Such
a resolution requires substantial amendment of the Supreme Court's present
position. This paper adopts a test to determine the existence of an agreement
under section 1 of the Sherman Act and an analysis follows that demonstrates
its validity.
I. THE PROBLEM
A. The Legal Context
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "every contract, combination ...
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade. '" A practice violates section 1 if it (1) is
a contract, combination or conspiracy,5 and (2) restrains trade. Unilateral con-
duct, no matter how anticompetitive, does not violate section 1.6 Similarly,
Associate Professor of Law, University of Idaho. B.A. 1973, Macalester College; J.D.
1977, University of Chicago.
1. 15 U.S.C. S 1 (1982).
2. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464, 1469-71 (1984).
3. United States v. Colgate Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
4. 15 U.S.C. S 1 (1982).
5. Different meanings may be given to each of the three words "contract," "combination"
and "conspiracy" for purposes of 5 1. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). For
purposes of this paper, however, these three terms together with the words "agreement" and
"concerted" action, conduct or behavior will be treated as synonymous.
6. Unilateral conduct may violate the prohibition against actual or attempted monopolization
contained in S 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 5 2 (1982), or may constitute a tort under state
or federal unfair competition law.
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concerted behavior does not violate section 1 unless it restrains trade within
the meaning of the Act.'
In determining whether concerted behavior is sufficiently anticompetitive to
be illegal under section 1, courts apply a two-tiered analysis. Courts generally
apply the "rule of reason" standard under which an assessment is made of
the procompetitive and anticompetitive aspects of the challenged practice.' Some
practices, however, are considered so likely to injure competition that they are
illegal per se.9 Practices the courts have characterized as per se illegal include
price fixing by competitors,"' price fixing by a supplier and a distributor,"
market allocations by competitors, 2 boycotts by competitors," and tying ar-
rangements.' 4 To establish a per se violation, the plaintiff need only prove that
the practice occurred. He is not required to show the practice was anticom-
petitive in the particular context." Indeed, the defendant may not defend the
practice by showing the practice was competitively neutral or even procom-
petitive." The courts developed per se rules to avoid the time consuming inquiry
into competitive effects otherwise required by the rule of reason.' 7 In adopting
7. The literal language of 5 1 condemns every agreement which restrains trade. However,
the Supreme Court has recognized that whether an agreement illegally restrains trade is a matter
of degree.
[T~he legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a test,
as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation
of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality
is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see also Standard Oil Co v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
8. See National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-92 (1978); Con-
tinental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
9. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) ("[There are certain
agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any
redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elab-
orate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.").
10. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
11. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151 (1968).
12. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).
13. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
14. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1556 (1984).
15. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
16. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 351 (1982). The Court
stated:
The respondents' principal argument is that the per se rule is inapplicable because their
agreements are alleged to have procompetitive justifications. The argument indicates a
misunderstanding of the per se concept. The anticompetitive potential inherent in all price-
fixing agreements justifies their facial invalidation even if procompetitive justifications are
offered for some. Those claims of enhanced competition are so unlikely to prove significant
in any particular case that we adhere to the rule of law that is justified in its general
application.
Id. (footnote omitted).
17. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). The Court stated:
This principle of per se unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints which are
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per se rules, courts acknowledge that occasionally these rules will condemn
conduct which is not anticompetitive in the specific circumstances.' 8 Courts
regard such erroneous results that arise from applying per se rules as the price
paid for saving the resources of courts, litigants, and persons planning business
behavior.' 9 Thus, the two elements of a violation of section 1 are: (1) an
agreement (2) that unreasonably restrains trade.21" Absent either of these two
elements, section 1 has not been violated.
B. Vertical Restrictions on Distribution: Per Se or Rule of Reason?
Some of the most controversial issues raised by section 1 are created by its
application to vertical restrictions on distribution. 21 -A vertical restriction on
distribution occurs when a distributor agrees with a supplier 2 to abide by
restrictions in reselling the product purchased 23 from the supplier. Vertical re-
strictions can be divided into two categories: those affecting the price at which
the distributor resells, referred to as resale price maintenance (RPM), and those
affecting where or to whom the distributor resells, referred to as nonprice vertical
proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it
also avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation
into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort
to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable - an inquiry
so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.
Id.; see also Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1982). "The
elaborate inquiry into the reasonableness of a challenged business practice entails significant costs.
Litigation of the effect or purpose of a practice often is extensive and complex .... The costs of
judging business practices under the rule of reason, however, have been reduced by the recognition
of per se rules." Id.
18. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) ("As in every
rule of general application, the match between the presumed and the actual is imperfect."); Con-
tincntal T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977) ("Cases that do not fit
the generalization may arise, but a per se rule reflects the judgment that such cases are not sufficiently
common or important to justify the time and expense necessary to identify them.").
19. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) ("For the
sake of business certainty and litigation efficiency, we have tolerated the invalidation of some
agreements that a fullblown inquiry might have proved to be reasonable."); Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977) ("Once established, per se rules tend to
provide guidance to the business community and to minimize the burdens on litigants and the
judicial system of the more complex rule-of-reason trials...").
20. The unreasonableness of the agreement may be established by the application of a per se
rule.
21. An agreement is vertical if it is between parties at different levels in the distribution
chain, e.g., a manufacturer and a wholesaler or a wholesaler and a retailer. An agreement is
horizontal if it is between competitors. An agreement may have both vertical and horizontal aspects,
e.g., an agreement among two wholesalers and their mutual supplier that the supplier will refuse
to deal with a third wholesaler.
22. This article assumes a two-level distribution chain in which a supplier sells to distributors.
A distribution chain could have many levels, e.g., manufacturers, wholesalers, jobbers, subjobbers,
and retailers. The analysis contained in this article would not be significantly altered for a distri-
bution chain with more than two levels.
23. The word "purchased" is not used in a sense requiring passage of title. Much of the
discussion set forth herein is also applicable to consignment transactions.
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restrictions. The controversy over vertical restrictions on distribution involves
both the standards for determining whether an agreement is present 4 and whether
a per se rule or the rule of reason applies.
2 5
1. Initial Per Se Rules
The standard for judging vertical restrictions on distribution has aroused
great scholarly debate."b Without the benefit of this commentary, the Supreme
Court addressed the issue over seventy-four years ago in Dr. Miles Medical Co.
v. John D. Park & Sons Co. 21 The plaintiff, Dr. Miles, alleged that the defendant
had induced the plaintiff's wholesalers and retailers to breach their contracts
with the plaintiff. These contracts required the wholesalers and retailers to resell
only at prices fixed by Dr. Miles.28 The defendant argued that the RPM agree-
ments were void, and therefore inducing their breach was not an actionable
wrong.2' The Court observed that Dr. Miles' RPM agreements restricted the
freedom of an owner to dispose of his property."' After noting that "a general
restraint upon alienation is ordinarily invalid,""' the Court stated that restraints
of trade must be reasonable for both the public and the contracting parties."2
In the Court's view, Dr. Miles' RPM restrictions on the dealer's freedom did
not pass the test of reasonableness. The Court additionally condemned the
agreements because, in its view, they were indistinguishable from horizontal
price fixing among the wholesalers or retailers.*" The Court held that because
a price-fixing distributor cartel would be illegal, a vertical agreement which
required the distributor to maintain price should also be illegal.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 80-116.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 26-79.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 51-63.
27. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
28. Id. at 394.
29. Id. at 395.
30. The Court characterized the agreements as "restricting the freedom of trade on the part
of dealers who own what they sell." Id. at 407-08.
31. Id. at 404.
32. Id. at 406.
With respect to contracts in restraint of trade, the earlier doctrine of the common law
has been substantially modified in adaptation to modern conditions. But the public interest
is still the first consideration. To sustain the restraint, it must be found to be reasonable
both with respect to the public and to the parties and that it is limited to what is fairly
necessary, in the circumstances of the particular case, for the protection of the covenantee.
Otherwise restraints of trade are void as against public policy.
Id.
33. Id. at 407-08.
[Tihe advantage of established retail prices primarily concerns the dealers. The enlarged
profits which would result from adherence to the established rates would go to them and
not to the complainant . . . . As to this, the complainant can fare no better with its plan
of identical contracts than could the dealers themselves if they formed a combination and
endeavored to establish the same restrictions, and thus to achieve the same result, by
agreement with each other. If the immediate advantage they would thus obtain would not
be sufficient to sustain such a direct agreement, the asserted ulterior benefit to the com-
plainant cannot be regarded as sufficient to support its system.
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Assuming the existence of an agreement, RPM has been per se illegal since
Dr. Miles.3 4 However, both of the justifications asserted in the Dr. Miles decision
have been rejected. The Court has rejected the argument that a concern about
restraints on alienation requires condemnation of vertical restrictions on distri-
bution.35 Further, the identity of RPM and distributor cartels has been called
into serious question.
3 6
While the per se illegality of RPM has remained constant since Dr. Miles, 
3 7
the standard for judging nonprice vertical restrictions has gone through dramatic
changes. In White Motor Co. v. United States, the Court refused to hold that
nonprice vertical restrictions were per se illegal." Four years later, however,
the Court imposed a per se standard on such restrictions. In United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,39 the government challenged a series of nonprice vertical
restrictions imposed by a bicycle manufacturer on its wholesalers and retailers.
Schwinn sold its bicycles through twenty-two wholesale distributors and ap-
proximately 5,500 retail dealers. Schwinn required its wholesale distributors to
limit their sales to exclusive territories and to sell only to approved retailers.
4"
Schwinn further required its retailers to sell only to consumers rather than to
other unapproved retailers.4' These restrictions aided in maintaining the bicycle
manufacturer's rigid marketing scheme. Schwinn sold its bicycles by three meth-
ods: (1) sales to distributors for resale to retailers; (2) sales to retailers through
a consignment to distributors; and (3) sales to retailers by the Schwinn Plan
under which the distributor acted as a commission sales agent for Schwinn but
never obtained possession of the bicycles. 42 Thus, in a sale for resale, the whole-
saler took both possession of and title to the bicycles. In a consignment trans-
action, the wholesaler took possession but not title. Under the "Schwinn Plan"
the wholesaler merely solicited orders and did not take either possession or title.
The district court held that Schwinn's confinement of its wholesale distrib-
utors to assigned territories was per se illegal in the sale for resale transactions.
43
The court, however, refused to enjoin (1) the confinement of wholesalers to
But agreements or combinations between dealers, having for their sole purpose the
destruction of competition and the fixing of prices, are injurious to the public interest and
void. They are not saved by the advantages which the participants expect to derive from
the enhanced price to the customer.
Id. Such a horizontal price fixing agreement would be per se illegal. See United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
34. See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, 1984 ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (SECoND) 56 [here-
inafter cited as DEVELOPMENTsJ.
35. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21; infra note 78
and accompanying text.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 51-63.
37. See supra text accompanying note 34.
38. 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
39. 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S.
36, 58 (1977).
40. 388 U.S. at 371.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 370.
43. Id. at 376.
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assigned territories in consignment or Schwinn Plan transactions; (2) the con-
finement of wholesalers to sales to retailers approved by Schwinn; or, (3) the
confinement of retailers to sales to consumers." Schwinn did not appeal the
district court's judgment of per se illegality for its territorial restrictions on
wholesalers in sales for resale. 4' The government did appeal the court's refusal
to enjoin the other three territorial and customer restrictions," although it did
not assert that those restrictions were per se illegal.47
The Supreme Court held that nonprice vertical restrictions on distribution
are per se illegal when imposed on a sale for resale. The rule of reason, however,
applies when the restrictions are imposed in a consignment or agency setting.,
The Court reasoned that in the -former situation the manufacturer parted with
dominion over an article and thus under section 1 of the Sherman Act it could
not restrict or confine areas where the article could be traded without a per
se violation. In the latter consignment or agency setting, however, the Court
reasoned that because the manufacturer retained dominion over the article,
restrictions could be imposed, as long as they were reasonable.4 " The Court
explained that allowing a supplier to impose customer or territorial restrictions
44. Id. at 376-77.
45. Id. at 368.
46. Id. at 377.
47. Id. at 368. In this regard, it is interesting to note that Judge Posner argued the case
for the United States. Id. at 366. As will be seen, Judge Posner is one of the most prominent
advocates of abolition of per se treatment of vertical restrictions on distribution. See R. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PEtSPECTIVE 147-66 (1976).
48. This required that the district court be directed to amend its decree to enjoin both
territorial and customer restrictions on wholesalers in sales for resale transactions and to enjoin the
customer restrictions on retailers (who only obtained bicycles in sale for resale transactions). 388
U.S. at 377-78. The Supreme Court's holding also required that the rule of reason be applied to
the territorial and customer restrictions on wholesalers in consignment and Schwinn Plan trans-
actions. The Court made this application and found the practices lawful. Id. at 380-81.
49. Id. at 378-80.
We conclude that the proper application of § I of the Sherman Act to this problem requires
differentiation between the situation where the manufacturer parts with the title, dominion,
or risk with respect to the article, and where he completely retains ownership and risk of
loss.
As the District Court held, where a manufacturer sells products to his distributor subject
to territorial restrictions upon resale, a per se violation of the Sherman Act results. And,
as we have held, the same principle applies to restrictions of outlets with which the dis-
tributors may deal and to restraints upon retailers to whom the goods are sold. Under
the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable without more for a manufacturer to seek to restrict
and confine areas or persons ith whom an article may be traded after the manufacturer
has parted with dominion over it ...
The Government does not here contend for a per se rule as to agency, consignment,
or Schwinn-Plan transactions even though these may be used - as they arc here - to
implement a scheme of confining distribution outlets as in this case. Where the manu-
facturer retains title, dominion, and risk with respect to the product and the position and
function of the dealer in question are, in fact, indistinguishable from those of an agent
or salesman of the manufacturer, it is only if the impact of the confinement is "unrea-
sonably" restrictive of competition that a violation of § I results from such confinement,
unencumbered by culpable price fixing.
[Vol XXXVII(M)
VERTICAL AGREEMENTS UNDER §1 OF SHERMAN ACT
in a sale for resale transaction "would violate the ancient rule against restraints
on alienation.""
Thus, by 1967, RPM was illegal per se and nonprice vertical restrictions
were per se illegal unless accomplished through consignment or agency trans-
actions. Although the cases establishing these rules were not supported by pow-
erful arguments based on uncontroverted economic analysis, they were generally
consistent. A storm of scholarly criticism and debate was, however, on the
horizon, and the consistency was soon disrupted.
2. Economic Arguments in Favor of Vertical Restrictions on Distribution.
Although Dr. Miles and Schwinn established uniform rules of per se illegality
for RPM and nonprice vertical restrictions, these rules were not quietly ac-
cepted. The standards applicable to vertical restrictions have aroused a vast
amount of commentary.5' Commentators have debated whether vertical restric-
tions on distribution are so anticompetitive that per se treatment is warranted.
If a scenario in which such restrictions have procompetitive effects is sufficiently
common, a per se standard is inappropriate.
RPM may have anticompetitive effects.5 2 The supplier may form a cartel
with specific distributors. The supplier may then enforce. RPM to prevent mem-
ber distributors from cheating on the price fixed by the group."' Similarly,
RPM may aid a cartel of suppliers by reducing the incentive for its members
to cheat. 5 Without RPM, a member of a supplier cartel may be tempted to
cheat by lowering its prices to distributors who may in turn lower prices to
consumers thereby increasing sales. 55 These price reductions to distributors may
50. Id. at 380. This idea echoes one of the Court's reasons for prohibiting RPM in Dr.
Miles. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
51. See, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox 280-98 (1978); H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS
AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 247-72 (1985); R. POSNER, supra note 47, at 147-66; Anderson, The
Antitrust Consequences of Manufacturer-Suggested Retail Prices - The Case for Presumptive illegality, 54 WASH.
L. REv. 763 (1979); Baxter, Vertical Practices - Half Slave, Half Free, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 743 (1983);
Calvani & Berg, Resale Price Maintenance after Monsanto: A Doctrine Still at War With Itself, 1984
DUKE LJ. 1163; Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135
(1984); Halverson, An Overview of Legal and Economic Issues and the Relevance of the Vertical Merger
Guidelines, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 49 (1983); Hay, Vertical Restraints After Monsanto, 70 CORNELL L. REv.
418 (1985); Popofsky, Lawyer's Response, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 719 (1983); Posner, The Next Step in
the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CH. L. REv. 6 (1981); Posner,
The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHN. L. REV.
1 (1977); Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal
Merger and Potential Competitor Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 282 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Posner,
Restricted Distribution]; Scherer, The Economics of Vertical Restraints, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 687 (1983).
52. The discussion in the text will focus on RPM. The arguments in favor of vertical re-
strictions on distribution have largely been accepted as applied to nonprice vertical restrictions. See
infra text accompanying notes 64-79. Thus, the continuing controversy relates to their application
to RPM.
53. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 47, at 148. There is some doubt whether a rational
supplier would become involved in such a scheme. See, e.g., H. HOVENKAMp, supra note 51, at
250-52.
54. See Halverson, supra note 51, at 64-67.
55. Id. at 65.
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be difficult for other members of the supplier cartel to detect because wholesale
prices are often not made public. However, if in addition to fixing the price
to the distributor the cartel members also agree to impose RPM and fix the
retail price, the incentive to cheat is reduced. Resale prices may be publicly
available and therefore easier for other cartel members to monitor. A member
of the supplier cartel cannot easily cheat by lowering its price to distributors
and allowing its distributors, in turn, to reduce the resale price fixed by the
cartel. If the resale price cannot be lowered to increase the quantity demanded
by consumers, the supplier has less incentive to reduce its price to the dis-
tributor.
The possibility that RPM may aid cartels, either at the distributor or the
supplier level, might be sufficient alone to condemn it as a per se violation
provided that RPM was chiefly used to aid cartels.", However, opponents of
per se illegality for RPM argue that RPM is often imposed by a supplier for
procompetitive reasons unrelated to the existence of a cartel. If that is true,
per se treatment is inappropriate. Thus the debate over application of the per
se rule to RPM turns upon the reasons for imposing RPM.
As a threshold matter two things are clear. First, the supplier would not
use RPM as a means of attaining an optimal combination of price and quantity.
If the supplier wished to restrict its output and raise prices it could do so
without RPM by simply producing less and raising its price to distributors. "
Second, the supplier would not use RPM to increase the spread between its
price to distributors and the distributors' resale price merely to put money in
the distributors' pockets. The supplier has no reason to give away money to
its distributors.' Nevertheless a supplier may claim that RPM fosters compe-
tition.
Proponents of RPM offer a paradoxical explanation of the procompetitive
function of RPM. They assert that the supplier increases the resale price of its
products to increase the quantity of the product demanded by consumers. This
seems paradoxical because, ordinarily, a higher resale price would reduce the
quantity demanded by consumers. 9 Thus, common sense would suggest that
at any given wholesale price a supplier would like its distributors to charge as
little as possible to increase the quantity demanded by consumers.'"' By imposing
RPM, however, the supplier is increasing rather than reducing resale prices
and would seem to be irrationally causing a reduction in quantity demanded."'
Proponents of RPM argue that the supplier must be counting on some other
effect of RPM to increase demand. They suggest that a greater margin between
56. Regardless of the standard applicable to RPM, the underlying cartel is illegal per se.
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
57. See R. BORK, supra note 51, at 290.
58. Id.
59. See R. POSNER, supra note 47, at 147.
60. Id. at 147-48.
61. It may be rational for a supplier to cause a reduction in quantity demanded by increasing
its price to its distributors. The reduction in output might be offset by the increase in price received
by the supplier. However, causing a reduction in quantity demanded by using RPM would be
irrational because the supplier would not receive any increase in its price to the distributor.
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the cost of the product and resale price induces distributors to provide pro-
motional service for the product. Proponents theorize that if RPM causes the
distributors' margin on the supplier's product to exceed the cost associated with
the usual distribution practices, distributors will engage in promotional activities
to sell more of the supplier's product. Because promotional activities increase
costs, distributors must decide what quantity of such activities to supply. They
will continue to engage in these activities until their costs equal the margin
provided by the supplier's RPM. If the supplier has guessed correctly in setting
the resale price, the demand-enhancing effects of the distributors' promotional
activities will offset the demand-diminishing effects of the increased resale price.
As a result, the quantity demanded by consumers will exceed that which would
exist without RPM.6
2
Proponents of RPM explain why RPM is necessary to induce the optimal
level of promotional services by introducing the "free rider problem." Simply
stated, the free rider problem occurs when some distributors provide product
promotion services while others do not. In the extreme, the "no-frills" dis-
tributor may charge a lower price for the goods because his costs are lower
than those of the promoting distributor. The promoting distributor has higher
costs caused by the promotional services, such as providing an elaborate show-
room or a sophisticated service department. The free riding occurs, for example,
when the buyer selects a model by visiting the promoting distributor's store
but purchases it from the non-promoting distributor.'i0
The proponents of RPM argue that, because of the free rider problem,
RPM is necessary to induce the promotional services that consumers desire.
Therefore, a supplier using RPM is not necessarily part of a distributor or
supplier cartel, but rather may be merely trying to efficiently fulfill consumer
desires. If such a procompetitive scenario is sufficiently probable, per se illegality
would be inappropriate. Presumably the possibility that RPM would be used
to assist a supplier or distributor cartel could be addressed by a combination
of the per se rule against cartels and analysis of RPM under the rule of reason.
62. See generally H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 51, at 254-55; Posner, Restricted Distribution, supra
note 51, at 283-84.
63. R. POSNERt supra note 47, at 149.
The reader may be wondering, however, why, if the consumer demands such services,
the retailers do not provide them without prompting and raise their pri[es to cover the
higher costs of distribution. The reason is that some retailers will prefer to provide no
services and instead take a "free ride" on those retailers who do. Let dealer A provide
the elaborate showroom, demonstration, and other services that consumers demand and
raise his price to cover the cost of the services. Dealer B, rather than provide any services,
can suggest to his customers that they first utilize A's services to pick the model they want
and then return to B for the purchase. B can offer a lower price than A since he does
not incur the expenses that A incurs in providing services. Faced with B's lower-priced
competition, A will eventually stop providing services (or provide fewer of them), and the
manufacturer's desire for point-of-sale services will be frustrated. Although the free riding
problem could be eliminated by A's charging separately for point-of-sale services, it should
be obvious why the manufacturer might not consider an admission fee to a dealer's show-
room a satisfactory alternative to a minimum retail price, which eliminates the incentive
for free riding by preventing B from undercutting A.
913
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3. Economic Arguments in Favor of Vertical Restrictions on
Distribution Are Accepted For Nonprice Restrictions
In Continental T V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. ,"' the Court addressed the
standard for judging nonprice vertical restraints in light of the modern schol-
arship."' Sylvania manufactured television sets for sale directly to retail dealers."
Sylvania allowed its dealers to resell its products only from locations specified
by Sylvania."' Continental, a Sylvania dealer, began selling Sylvania products
at a location not approved by Sylvania. After this violation of the location
requirement and deterioration in their credit relationship, Sylvania terminated
Continental's dealership."' In response to a collection action brought by Syl-
vania, Continental challenged the legality of Sylvania's location restrictions un-
der section 1."' Thus, if the restrictions were to be upheld, the per se rule
announced in the Schwinn case would have to be overruled. The Court noted
that many scholars "' criticized Schwinn and that lower courts limited its holding."
The Court then proceeded to measure its per se rule against the traditional
standards for such rules.
To determine whether nonprice vertical restrictions have a "pernicious effect
on competition and lack ... any redeeming virtue,' ' 2 the Court turned to an
analysis of their potential for benefit and detriment to competition. While ac-
64. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
65. See supra text accompanying notes 51-63.
66. 433 U.S. at 38.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 40.
69. Id. at 45-46. The Court declined to distinguish the Sylvania location restriction from the
restraints involved in Schwinn stating that the differences were "irrelevent to functional antitrust
analysis and, indeed, to the language and broad thrust of the opinion in Schwinn." Id. at 46.
70. Id. at 48 n.13.
A former Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division has described
Schwinn as an "exercise in barren formalism" that is "artificial and unresponsive to the
competitive needs of the real world." Baker, Vertical Restraints in Times of Change: From
White to Schwinn to Where?, 44 Antitrust L.J. 537 (1975). See, e.g., Handler, The Twentieth
Annual Antitrust Review-1967, 53 Va. L. Rev. 1667 (1967); McLaren, Territorial Cus-
tomer Restrictions, Consignments, Suggested Retail Prices and Refusals to Deal, 37 An-
titrust L.J. 137 (1968); Pollock, Alternative Distribution Methods After Schwinn, 63 Nw.
U.L. Rev. 595 (1968); Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court An Analysis of
the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75
Colum. L. Rev. 282 (1975); Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 1974, 75 Colum
L. Rev. 244 (1975); Note, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions in the Franchising
Industry, 10 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Prob. 497 (1974); Note, Territorial and Customer Re-
strictions: A Trend Toward a Broader Rule of Reason?, 40 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 123
(1971); Note, Territorial Restrictions and Per Se Rules-A Re-evaluation of the Schwinn
and Scaly Doctrines, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 616 (1972). But see Louis, Vertical Distributional
Restraints Under Schwinn and Sylvania: An Argument for the Continuing Use of a Partial
Per Se Approach, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 275 (1976); Zimmerman, Distribution Restrictions
After Scaly and Schwinn, 12 Antitrust Bull. 1181 (1967). For a more inclusive list of articles
and comments, see 537 F.2d at 988 n. 13.
Id.
71. Id. at 48 n.14.
72. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
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knowledging that such restrictions reduce intrabrand competition, 73 the Court
recognized that they also have a potential for increasing interbrand competition.
In doing so, the Court focused on the distributional efficiency and free rider
arguments discussed above.
74
Because of the potential for procompetitive effects, the Sylvania Court over-
ruled the per se rule established in Schwinn and held that nonprice vertical
restrictions should be governed by the rule of reason.7" The Court rejected the
distinction made in the Schwinn decision between sales for resale and consign-
ment transactions. 76' Instead it concluded that the form of the transaction did
not alter the economic effect of the restriction. 77 The Court expressly rejected
the Schwinn Court's concern about restraints on alienation as a reason for pro-
hibiting vertical restrictions. 7 Although the Sylvania Court accepted the argu-
73. Vertical restrictions reduce intraband competition by limiting the number of sellers of
a particular product competing for the business of a given group of buyers. Location
restrictions have this effect because of practical constraints on the effective marketing area
of retail outlets. Although intrabrand competition may be reduced, the ability of retailers
to exploit the resulting market may be limited both by the ability of consumers to travel
to other franchised locations and, perhaps more importantly, to purchase the competing
product of other manufacturers.
433 U.S. at 54.
74. Id. at 54-55.
Vertical restrictions promote interbrand competition by allowing the manufacturer to
achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of his products. These "redeeming virtues"
are implicit in every decision sustaining vertical restrictions under the rule of reason.
Economists have identified a number of ways in which manufacturers can use such re-
strictions to compete more effectively against other manufacturers. See, e.g., Preston, Re-
strictive Distribution Arrangements: Economic Analysis and Public Policy Standards, 30
Law & Contemp. Prob. 506, 511 (1965). For example, new manufacturers and manufac-
turers entering new markets can use the restrictions in order to induce competent and
aggressive retailers to make the kind of investment of capital and labor that is often required
in the distribution of products unknown to the consumer. Established manufacturers can
use them to induce retailers to engage in promotional activities or to provide service and
repair facilities necessary to the efficient marketing of their products, such as automobiles
and major household appliances. The availability and quality of such services affect a
manufacturer's goodwill and the competitiveness of his product. Because of market im-
perfections such as the so-called "free rider" effect, these services might not be provided
by retailers in a purely competitive situation, despite the fact that each retailer's benefit
would be greater if all provided the services than if none did.
Id. (footnote and citations omitted); see also supra text accompanying notes 51-63.
75. 433 U.S. at 58.
76. Id. at 57.
77. "Nor is there even an assertion in the [Schwinn] opinion that the competitive impact of
vertical restrictions is significantly affected by the form of the transaction." Id. at 54.
78. The Court [in &hwinn] also stated that to impose vertical restrictions in sale transactions
would "violate the ancient rule against restraints on alienation." 388 U.S. at 380. This
isolated reference has provoked' sharp criticism from virtually all of the commentators on
the decision, most of whom have regarded the Court's apparent reliance on the "ancient
rule" as both a misreading of legal history and a perversion of antitrust analysis. We
quite agree with MR. JUSTICE STEWART'S dissenting comment in Schwinn that "the state
of the common law 400 or even 100 years ago is irrelevant to the issue before us: the
effect of the antitrust laws upon vertical distributional restraints in the American economy
today." 388 U.S. at 392.
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ments favoring vertical restrictions, its holding is limited to nonprice restrictions.
In dicta, the Court expressly rejected using those same arguments to overturn
the per se rule against RPM. 9
After Sylvania, nonprice vertical restrictions are subject to the rule of reason,
and RPM is per se illegal. This distinction creates tension over the standards
applicable to two similar types of restrictions. It also may impact the standards
for determining whether the necessary agreement exists that gives rise to an
alleged vertical restriction.
C. Agreement Issues in Vertical Contexts
A vertical practice is unlawful under section 1 only if it results from an
agreement."' Thus, the standard for determining whether an agreement is pres-
ent can be crucial. This issue is especially important with respect to RPM,
because if an agreement is proved, the conduct is per se illegal."' This section
will set forth two common scenarios that give rise to vertical agreement issues.
In the supplier-initiated scenario, the issue is whether a supplier's conduct fol-
lowed by a distributor's response creates an inference of an agreement. The
Id. at 53 n.21 (citations omitted). The Court also rejected the same argument phrased as a concern
about the autonomy of traders.
We are similarly unable to accept Judge Browning's interpretation of Schwinn. In his
dissent below he argued that the decision reflects the view that the Sherman Act was
intended to prohibit restrictions on the autonomy of independent businessmen even though
they have no impact on "price, quality, and quantity of goods and services," 537 F.2d,
at 1019. This view is certainly not explicit in Schwinn, which purports to be based on an
examination of the "impact [of the restrictions] upon the marketplace." 388 U.S., at 374.
Competitive economies have social and political as well as economic advantages . .. but
an antitrust policy divorced from market considerations would lack any objective bench-
marks. As Mr. Justice Brandeis reminded us: "Every agreement concerning trade, every
regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence." Chicago Bd
of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. at 238.
Id. (citation omitted).
79. As in Schwinn, we are concerned here only with nonprice vertical restrictions. The per se
illegality of price restrictions has been established firmly for many years and involves
significantly different questions of analysis and policy. As MR. JUSTICE WHITE notes, . . .
some commentators have argued that the manufacturer's motivation for imposing vertical
price restrictions may be the same as for nonprice restrictions. There are, however, sig-
nificant differences that could easily justify different treatment. In his concurring opinion
in White Motor Co. v. United States, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN noted that, unlike nonprice
restrictions, "[rlesale price maintenance is not only designed to, but almost invariably does
in fact, reduce price competition not only among sellers of the affected product, but quite
as much between that product and competing brands." 372 U.S., at 268. Professor Posner
also recognized that "industry-wide resale price maintenance might facilitate carteliz-
ing.". . . Furthermore, Congress recently has expressed its approval of a per se analysis
of vertical price restrictions by repealing those provisions of the Miller-Tydings and McGuire
Acts allowing fair trade pricing at the option of the individual States. Consumer Goods
Pricing Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 801, amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45(a). No similar expression
of congressional intent exists for nonprice restrictions.
Id. at 51 n.18 (citations omitted); see also Posner, Restricted Distribution, supra note 51, at 294.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 4-6.
81. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151 (1968).
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distributor-initiated scenario also raises the agreement issue, but begins with
distributor conduct followed by supplier response.
1. The Supplier-Initiated Scenario - The Colgate Doctrine
The required agreement is obviously present in some supplier-initiated scen-
arios. For example, in Dr. Miles the supplier made the distributor enter into
contracts to maintain certain prices. 2 However, in the absence of express con-
tracts, the trier of fact must determine whether the supplier and the distributor
have agreed that the distributor will abide by restrictions on resale.": Resolving
this issue, a sufficiently difficult task on its face, was made even more formidable
by the decision in United States v. Colgate & Co.
4
In Colgate, the government charged that Colgate violated the rule against
RPM established in Dr. Miles.85 The indictment charged that Colgate engaged
in conduct "6 which caused its wholesalers and retailers to maintain resale prices.
87
82. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
83. 15 U.S.C. 5 1 (1982).
84. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
85. Id. at 302-03. The indictment read in part as follows:
"During the aforesaid period of time, within the said eastern district of Virginia and
throughout the United States, the defendant knowingly and unlawfully created and engaged
in a combination with said wholesale and retail dealers, in the eastern district of Virginia
and throughout the United States, for the purpose and with the effect of procuring ad-
herence on the part of such dealers (in reselling such products sold to them as aforesaid)
to resale prices fixed by the defendant, and of preventing such dealers from reselling such
products at lower prices, thus supressing competition amongst such wholesale dealers, and
amongst such retail dealers, in restraint of the aforesaid trade and commerce among the
several States, in violation of the act entitled 'An Act to protect trade and commerce
against unlawful restraints and monopolies,' approved July 2, 1890."
Id.
86. Id. at 303.
[The indictment contains] a summary of things done to carry out the purposes of the
combination: Distribution among dealers of letters, telegrams, circulars, and lists showing
uniform prices to be charged; urging them to adhere to such prices and notices, stating
that no sales would be made to those who did not; requests, often complied with, for
information concerning dealers who had departed from specified prices; investigation and
discovery of those not adhering thereto and placing their names upon "suspended lists";
requests to offending dealers for assurances and promises of future adherence to prices,
which were often given; uniform refusals to sell to any who failed to give the same; sales
to those who did; similar assurances and promises required of, and given by, other dealers
followed by sales to them; unrestricted sales to dealers with established accounts who had
observed specified prices, etc.
Id.
87. The indictment summarized this effect as follows:
"By reason of the foregoing, wholesale dealers in the aforesaid products of the defendant
in the eastern district of Virginia and throughout the United States, with few exceptions,
resold, at uniform prices fixed by the defendant, and refused to resell such products at
lower prices to retail dealers in the States where the respective wholesale dealers did business
and in other States. For the same reason retail dealers in the aforesaid products of the
defendant in the eastern district of Virginia and throughout the United States resold, at
uniform prices fixed by the defendant, the aforesaid products, sold to them by the defendant
and by the aforesaid wholesale dealers, and refused to sell such products at lower prices
19851
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Despite the government's allegations, the trial court dismissed the indictment,
holding that it did not charge a violation of section 1."
On appeal, the Supreme Court stated that it was bound by the trial court's
interpretation of the indictment." This determination led the Court to forsake
the indictment and search for the trial court's interpretation. Part of the trial
court's opinion seemed to indicate it viewed the indictment as charging a com-
bination and agreement to maintain resale prices."' The government argued
that this language supported application of the Dr. Miles rule. The Supreme
Court, however, focused on other portions of the trial court opinion and upheld
the dismissal."' The Court went on to state what has come to be known as
the "Colgate doctrine":
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the
act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer
engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own in-
to the consuming public in the States where the respective retail dealers did business and
in other States. Thus competition in the sale of such products, by wholesale dealers to
retail dealers, and by retail dealers to the consuming public, was suppressed, and the prices
of such products to the retail dealers and to the consuming public in the eastern district
of Virginia and throughout the United States were maintained and enhanced."
Id. at 303-04.
88. Id. at 302.
89. Id. at 301-02.
90. Id. at 304-05.
In the course of its opinion, the trial court said:
"No charge is made that any contract was entered into by and on the part of the
defendant, and any of its retail customers, in restraint of interstate trade and commerce
- the averment being, in effect, that it knowingly and unlawfully created and engaged
in a combination with certain of its wholesale and retail customers, to procure adherence
on their part, in the sale of its products sold to them, to resale prices fixed by the defendant,
and that, in connection therewith, such wholesale and retail customers gave assurances and
promises, which resulted in the enhancement and maintenance of such prices, and in the
suppression of competition by wholesale dealers and retail dealers, and by the latter to the
consuming public.
"In the view taken by the court, the indictment here fairly presents the question of
whether a manufacturer of products shipped in interstate trade, is subject to criminal
prosecution under the Sherman Act, for entering into a combination in restraint of such
trade and commerce, because he agrees with his wholesale and retail customers, upon
prices claimed by them to be fair and reasonable, at which the same may be resold, and
declines to sell his products to those who will not thus stipulate as to prices."
Id.
91. Id. at 306-07.
Considering all said in the opinion (notwithstanding some serious doubts) we arc unable
to accept the construction placed upon it by the Government. We cannot, e.g., wholly
disregard the statement that "The retailer, after buying, could, if he chose, give away his
purchase, or sell it at any price he saw fit, or not sell it at all; his course in these respects
being affected only by the fact that he might by his action incur the displeasure of the
manufacturer, who could refuse to make further sales to him, as he had the undoubted
right to do." And we must conclude that, as interpreted below, the indictment does not
charge Colgate & Company with selling its products to dealers under agreements which
obligated the latter not to resell except at prices fixed by the company.
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dependent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal. And, of
course, he may announce in advance the circumstances under which he
will refuse to sell.! '
The Court seemed to say that a supplier may lawfully coerce its distributors
into complying with its desired resale prices by announcing and following a
policy of refusing to deal with distributors who do not comply. Apparently, the
required agreement would be absent.93 Thus, under Colgate, coerced compliance
with RPM would be per se lawful because no express agreement or contract
exists.
Limiting application of the per se rule against RPM to formal contracts
might be plausible if the rule was only based on concerns about restraints upon
alienation.94 The Dr. Miles Court, however, relied upon an analogy to dealer
cartels in addition to a concern about restraints on alienation. '* Therefore,
requiring a formal contract before finding a violation of section 1 is inappro-
priate. 'Y If the concept of "contract, combination . .. or conspiracy" includes
more than formal contracts, Colgate's apparent holding that no agreement was
present is difficult to square with the trial court's interpretation of the indictment
allegations regarding assurance and promises of adherence to resale prices.' 7
Not surprisingly, the Colgate doctrine proved unstable. By the time the Court
had decided United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.," the doctrine appeared to have
little practical application. The government sought to enjoin practices by Parke,
Davis that the government argued violated the per se rule against RPM.!'!' The
trial court held that the Colgate doctrine protected Parke, Davis' conduct.""' The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defendant's conduct did not fall within
the doctrine.'"
Parke, Davis sold its pharmaceutical products both to wholesalers and di-
rectly to retailers.' 2 To maintain resale prices the pharmaceutical company: (1)
announced a policy of refusing to sell to wholesalers who did not follow its
wholesale resale price schedule or who sold to retailers who did not follow its
retail resale price schedule;' 3 and (2) informed retailers that neither it nor its
wholesalers would sell to retailers who failed to follow its retail resale price
92. Id. at 307.
93. However, for an argument that the Colgate doctrine assumes the existence of the required
agreement but holds that such an agreement is lawful because of the supplier's freedom of trade,
see Baker, Interconnected Problems of Doctrine and Economics in the Section One Labyrinth: Is Sylvania a
Way Out?, 67 VA. L. REv. 1457, 1476-77 (1981).
94. See Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals
to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REv. 655, 687-88 (1962).
95. See supra text accompanying note 33.
96. See Turner, supra note 94, at 687-88.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 86-90.
98. 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
99. Id. at 30-31.
100. Id. at 36.
101. Id. at 45.
102. Id. at 31-32.
103. Id. at 32-33.
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schedule."°4 When several retailers subsequently refused to follow Parke, Davis'
resale price schedule, both Parke, Davis and its wholesalers refused to fill orders
from those retailers.
'0
In holding that Parke, Davis' actions were not sheltered by the Colgate
doctrine, the Court reviewed that doctrine's history.'"" In light of the earlier
cases interpreting the doctrine,"" the Court concluded that it should be applied
only where the supplier limits its action to a mere announcement of its policy
and a subsequent refusal to deal."'" The Court ruled that Parke, Davis' conduct
went beyond the limited protection provided by the Colgate doctrine by involving
its wholesalers in the enforcement. '
Thus, the analysis used by the Court in Parke, Davis limited the Colgate
doctrine. The doctrine applied only where the supplier went no further than
announcing and following a policy of refusing to deal with purchasers who did
not comply with the desired resale restrictions. One lower court concluded
shortly after Parke, Davis that, "[t]he Supreme Court has left a narrow channel
through which a manufacturer may pass even though the facts would have to
104. Id. at 33-34.
105. Id. at 34. Parke, Davis' efforts to maintain retail resale prices eventually failed. The
program was first modified to require only that retailers refrain from advertising prices below those
set by Parke, Davis. Id. at 35-36. Shortly thereafter, even this limited program was abandoned
and retailers were allowed to sell below the prices set by Parke, Davis and to advertise those
discounted prices. Id. at 36.
106. Id. at 38-45.
107. See; United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); Federal Trade
Comm'n v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922); Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing
Co., 256 U.S. 208 (1921); United States v. Schrader & Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
108. [The Bausch & Lomb and Beech-Nut decisions] teach that judicial inquiry is not to stop
with a search of the record for evidence of purely contractual arrangements. The Sherman
Act forbids combinations of traders to suppress competition. True, there results the same
economic effect as is accomplished by a prohibited combination to suppress price com-
petition if each customer, although induced to do so solely by a manufacturer's announced
policy, independently decides to observe specified resale prices. So long as Colgate is not
overruled, this result is tolerated but only when it is the consequence of a mere refusal
to sell in the exercise of the manufacturer's right "freely to exercise his own independent
discretion as to parties with whom he will deal." When the manufacturer's actions, as
here, go beyond mere announcement of his policy and the simple refusal to deal, and he
employs other means which effect adherence to his resale prices, this countervailing con-
sideration is not present and therefore he has put together a combination in violation of
the Sherman Act.
362 U.S. at 44.
109. The program upon which Parke Davis embarked to promote general compliance with
its suggested resale prices plainly exceeded the limitations of the Colgate doctrine and under
Beech-Nut and Bausch & Lomb effected arrangements which violated the Sherman Act. Parke
Davis did not content itself with announcing its policy regarding retail prices and following
this with a simple refusal to have business relations with any retailers who disregarded
that policy. Instead Parke Davis used the refusal to deal with the wholesalers in order to
elicit their willingness to deny Parke Davis products to retailers and thereby help gain the
retailer's adherence to its suggested minimum retail prices. . . . In thus involving the
wholesalers to stop the flow of Parke Davis products to the retailers, thereby inducing
retailers' adherence to its suggested retail prices, Parke Davis created a combination with
the retailers and the wholesalers to maintain retail prices and violated the Sherman Act.
Id. at 45.
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be of such Doric simplicity as to be somewhat rare in this day of complex
business enterprise."1'0 While the protection provided by the Colgate doctrine
was still uncertain, it seemed more limited than ever after Parke, Davis.
The meaning, extent, and continuing validity of the Colgate doctrine has
been the object of commentary"' and judicial opinion." 2 The Colgate doctrine
and the per se rule against RPM have operated as opposing forces, seemingly
incapable of principled reconciliation. One effect of the current debate over the
per se rule against RPM is that the Colgate doctrine has been vested with
renewed vigor."
3
2. The Distributor-Initiated Scenario - Supplier
Response to Distributor Complaints
The Colgate doctrine applies to the supplier-initiated scenario, where the
supplier acts and the distributor responds. Vertical agreement issues also arise
in the distributor-initiated scenario, where the distributor acts and the supplier
responds. The distributor usually complains to the supplier about price cutting
by another distributor, and the supplier responds by terminating the second
distributor. The issue is whether the supplier and the complaining distributor
have entered into an agreement. The parties might merely agree that the sup-
plier should terminate the second distributor, or they may also include an
implicit term that the complaining distributor will refrain from price cutting.'
4
The distributor-initiated scenario is analytically parallel to the supplier-ini-
tiated scenario." 5 The distributor-initiated scenario has not, however, been the
object of a long standing doctrine such as the Colgate doctrine. The standard
110. George W..Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 787, 790 (1960).
111. See, e.g., ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 9, REFUSALS TO DEAL AND EXCLUSIVE
DISTRIBUTORSHIPs (1983); Baker, supra note 92, at 1471-88; Campbell & Ware, Russell Stover and
the Vertical Agreenment Puzzle, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 83 (1983); Day, New Theories of Agreement and Com-
bination, 42 ANTITRUST L.J. 287 (1973); Fulda, Individual Rffisals to Deal: W4hen Does Single-Firm
Conduct Become Vertical Restraint?, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROS. 590 (1965); Greenberg, Unilateral
Refusals to Deal, 42 ANTITRUST L.J. 305 (1973); Kilburn, Other Vertical Problems: Pricing, Refusals to
Deal, Distribution, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 173 (1982); Levi, The Parke, Davis-Colgate Doctrine: The Ban
on Resale Price Maintenance, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 258 (1960): Pitofsky & Dam, Is the Colgate Doctrine
Dead?, 37 ANTITRUST LJ. 772 (1968); Turner, supra note 94, at 684-705; Note, Refusal to Deal as
a Per Se Violation of the Sherman Act: Russell Stover Attacks the Colgate Doctrine, 33 AM. U.L. REv.
463 (1984); Note, Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission: 65 Years Later,
Confusion Over the Colgate Doctrine Still Persists, 13 CAP. U.L. REv. 661 (1984); Note, A Definition
of Agreement; Identifying Purely Unilateral Conduct in Vertical Price Restriction Cases, 19 VAL. U. L. REv.
765 (1985); Comment, The Colgate Doctrine: Its Past and Present, 12 Hous. L. REv. 409 (1975);
Comment, Unilateral Refiual to Deal. King Colgate is Dead, 30 OHIo ST. L.J. 537 (1969); A Dfinition
of Agreement: Identying Purely Unilateral Conduct in Vertical Price Restriction Cases, 19 VAL. U. L. REv.
765 (1985).
112. In Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. FTC, 718 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1983), the court reversed
an attempt by the Commission to virtually abolish the Colgate doctrine in the context of distributor
terminations.
113. See infra text accompanying notes 189-99.
114. See infra note 186.
115. See infra text accompanying notes 182-86.
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applicable to the conspiracy issues raised by the distributor-initiated scenario
remained sufficiently unsettled in 1984 to force the Supreme Court to resolve
the conflict among the federal appellate courts."1 6
D. The Supreme Court's Present Position
Regarding Vertical Agreement Issues
The law applicable to vertical restrictions on competition is complex and
dynamic. As a threshold matter, a conspiracy must exist. The conspiracy may
arise in either supplier- or distributor-initiated scenarios. If a court finds a
conspiracy giving rise to a nonprice vertical restriction, it will judge the re-
striction under the rule of reason. An RPM conspiracy, however, is per se
illegal. All of these concepts come into play in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service
Corp. H,7
1. A Supplier Challenges a Conspiracy Finding in the
Distributor-Initiated Scenario and the Solicitor General
Challenges the Per Se Rule Against RPM
From 1957 to 1968, Spray-Rite was a wholesale distributor of Monsanto
herbicides."" In 1968, Monsanto refused to renew Spray-Rite's distribution con-
tract.119 Spray-Rite sued Monsanto and alleged that this refusal resulted from
a conspiracy between Monsanto and at least one other distributor to fix the
distributor resale price for Monsanto herbicides. Further, Spray-Rite alleged
that this conspiracy was per se illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act. In
answering a special interrogatory, the jury found that Monsanto's termination
of Spray-Rite did occur because of a conspiracy.' 21' Spray-Rite received a multi-
million dollar damage award.
On appeal, Monsanto challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the jury's finding of a conspiracy. In upholding the verdict, the court of appeals
focused on the distributor-initiated scenario and held that "[piroof of distrib-
utorship termination in response to competing distributors' complaints about
the terminated distributor's pricing policies ig sufficient to raise an inference of
concerted action.''2 Monsanto renewed its challenge to the jury's conspiracy
finding before the Supreme Court. It argued that the court of appeals applied
the wrong standard and that evidence that a supplier terminated a distributor
116. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464, 1468 (1984).
117. 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984).
118. Id. at 1467.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226, 1239 (7th Cir. 1982), aff'd on
other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984). Earlier in its opinion, the court of appeals stated: "We
believe, however, that proof of termination following competitor complaints is sufficient to support
an inference of concerted action." Id. at 1238. Arguably, the two standards are different because
the language "in response to" requires a causal link between the complaint and the termination
while "following" does not. See 104 S. Ct. at 1468 n.4.
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in response to a complaint by another distributor does not suffice, standing
alone, to support the inference of a conspiracy.
In addition to Monsanto's conspiracy argument, the Solicitor General filed
a brief suggesting that the per se rule against RPM should be overturned.
2 2
The trial court instructed the jury that if it found a conspiracy to fix resale
prices of Monsanto products, such a conspiracy would be per se illegal.' 2 1 This
instruction was, of course, firmly based on the per se rule against RPM estab-
lished in Dr. Miles. The Solicitor General asserted that the arguments accepted
in the Sylvania decision with respect to nonprice vertical restrictions applied with
equal force to RPM.
24
Specifically, the brief argued that, because of possible procompetitive effects,
per se treatment of RPM was inappropriate. 25 While acknowledging the pos-
sibility that RPM could have anticompetitive effects, the Solicitor General con-
tended that both the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of RPM should
be assessed on a case by case basis.
2 6
2. The Holding: The Per Se Rule Against RPM Remains Intact
and the Conspiracy Finding is Upheld
Despite the arguments presented by Monsanto and the Solicitor General,
the Supreme Court held for the plaintiff.2 7 The Court refused to abolish the
rule against RPM. 28 This, however, does not necessarily mean that the eco-
122. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 19-29, Monsanto
Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Brief for the United
States].
123. 104 S. Ct. at 1467.
124. Resale price maintenance can have the same types of procompetitive effects recognized
in Sylvania as possible consequences of nonprice vertical restraints. By eliminating intrabrand
price competition, the manufacturer may enable its distributors to provide costly promo-
tional, warranty, or other ancillary services and thereby increase the attractiveness of the
product. Indeed, it is the indirect lessening of price competition by nonprice vertical re-
strictions that eliminates the free-rider problem and gives such restrictions their procom-
petitive potential .... Price related vertical restrictions in general, and resale price
maintenance in particular, accomplish directly what nonprice vertical restraints accomplish
indirectly: both types of practice are designed to increase both price and sales volume.
Brief for the United States at 21-22 (footnote omitted).
125. Id. at 24.
126. Id. at 23-24.
127. 104 S. Ct. at 1473. The Court determined that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence
to support a jury verdict in its favor. Id.
128. The Solicitor General (by brief only) and several other amici suggest that we take
this opportunity to reconsider whether "contract(s), combination(s) ... or conspirac(ies)"
to fix resale prices should always be unlawful. They argue that the economic effect of
resale price maintenance is little different from the agreements on nonprice restrictions.
See generally Continental T. V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 69-70, 97 S.Ct.
2549, 2567-2568, 53 L.Ed.2d 568 (1977) (WHITE, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing
sources); Baker, Interconnected Problems of Doctrine and Economics in the Section One
Labyrinth: Is Sylvania a Way Out?, 67 Va.L.Rev. 1457, 1465-1466 (1981). They say that
the economic objections to resale price maintenance that we discussed in Sylvania, supra,
at 51, n.18, 97 S.Ct. at 2558, n.18 - such that it facilitates horizontal cartels - can be
met easily in the context of rule-of-reason analysis.
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nomic arguments in favor of RPM had no impact on the Court. Those ar-
guments apparently affected the Court's views on the conspiracy issues
presented. 29
In upholding the verdict, the Spray-Rite Court found sufficient evidence to
support the jury's conclusion that Monsanto's termination of Spray-Rite oc-
curred because of a price-fixing conspiracy. The Court relied on the cumulative
impact of four items of evidence to reach this conclusion:
(1) other distributors complained to Monsanto about Spray-Rite's prices;""
(2) Monsanto approached other price-cutting distributors and threatened
that unless they maintained suggested resale prices, they would not
receive adequate supplies of Monsanto's new corn herbicide;' 3'
(3) one of the threatened distributors informed Monsanto that it would
maintain the suggested price; 32 and
(4) a distributor newsletter that the Court found could reasonably be in-
terpreted to support the existence of an agreement or understanding
that distributors and retailers would maintain pre-set prices or face
termination by Monsanto.'
33
Thus, Spray-Rite held that the combination of the foregoing evidence sufficiently
supported an inference of a conspiracy between supplier and distributor to
maintain resale prices and terminate discounters.
3. The Dicta: Evidence of Distributor Complaints Deemed Insufficient
and the Colgate Doctrine Resurrected
Taken alone, the Spray-Rite Court's holding is not troublesome. The Court,
however, in expansive dicta, identified two types of evidence that, standing
alone, would not support a finding of conspiracy. First, complaints about the
terminated distributor to the supplier by non-terminated distributors, while pro-
bative, were not alone sufficient to uphold a finding of a conspiracy. '34 The
Court thus rejected the rationale of the court of appeals but upheld its judgment
in favor of the plaintiff based on the cumulative impact of the evidence of a
conspiracy. 31 In so doing, the Court was addressing the conflict between the
circuits regarding the adequacy of evidence of distributor complaints to support
Certainly in this case we have no occasion to consider the merits of this argument.
This case was tried on per se instructions to the jury. Neither party argued in the District
Court that the rule of reason should apply to a vertical price-fixing conspiracy, nor raised
the point on appeal. In fact, neither party before this Court presses the argument advance
by amici. We therefore decline to reach the question, and we decide the case in the context
in which it was decided below and argued here.
Id. at 1469-70 n.7.
129. See infra text accompanying notes 187-99.
130. 104 S. Ct. at 1470-71.
131. Id. at 1471.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1472.
134. Id. at 1470-71.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 130-33.
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a conspiracy finding.' 36 In the Court's view, allowing a trier of fact to infer
an RPM conspiracy solely from evidence of distributor complaints about a
rival's resale prices could lead to erroneous results. Such evidence might only
indicate conduct that was lawful because: (1) only a nonprice vertical agreement
is present and the rule of reason is not violated, or (2) under the Colgate doctrine,
no agreement is present.
The Court's concern that price-related distributor complaints might indicate
only nonprice vertical restrictions rather than RPM is understandable. The
former are subject to the rule of reason while the latter is per se illegal. 
1 7
While acknowledging this disparate treatment, the Court nevertheless recognized
that nonprice restrictions can have price effects. 38 Nonprice vertical restrictions
may indirectly raise distributor resale prices by reducing competition among
distributors. This increase in price allows distributors to provide the promotional
services desired by the supplier. Distributors who believe that the nonprice
vertical restrictions do not maintain adequate prices to pay for desired pro-
motional services may complain about discounting by their fellow distributors.'
3 9
The Court stated that these distributor complaints together with evidence of a
supplier's interest in its distributors' resale prices do not turn a nonprice vertical
restriction into per se illegal RPM.'14
The Court's second reason was the fear that inferring a conspiracy from
distributor complaints would endanger the Colgate doctrine by punishing conduct
protected by that doctrine.' 4' In setting forth its concern for the Colgate doctrine,
the Court stated the doctrine without limitation.
This Court has drawn two important distinctions that are at the center
of this and any other distributor-termination case. First, there is the
basic distinction between concerted and independent action - a dis-
tinction not always clearly drawn by parties and courts. Section 1 of the
136. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 21-79.
138. 104 S. Ct. at 1470.
[I]t is precisely in cases in which the manufacturer attempts to further a particular marketing
strategy by means of agreements on often costly nonprice restrictions that it will have the
most interest in the distributors' resale prices. The manufacturer often will want to ensure
that its distributors earn sufficient profit to pay for programs such as hiring and training
additional salesmen or demonstrating the technical features of the product, and will want
to see that "free-riders" do not interfere.
Id.
139. Id.
As Monsanto points out, complaints about price-cutters "are natural - and from the
manufacturer's perspective, unavoidable - reactions by distributors to the activities of their
rivals." Such complaints, particularly where the manufacturer has imposed a costly set of
nonprice restrictions, "arise in the normal course of business and do not indicate illegal
concerted action."
Id.
140. See id. at 1470-71. It is possible to view the Court's discussion of this issue as demon-
strating that RPM and nonprice vertical restrictions are so similar that they should be subject to
the same standard. See Easterbrook, supra note 51, at 169-72.
141. 104 S. Ct. at 1469-71.
1985]
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LA W REVIEW
Sherman Act requires that there be a "contract,. combination . . . or
conspiracy" between the manufacturer and other distributors in order
to establish a violation. 15 U.S.C. § 1. Independent action is not pros-
cribed. A manufacturer of course generally has a right to deal, or refuse
to deal, with whomever it likes, as long as it does so independently.
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307, 39 S. Ct. 465, 468,
63 L.Ed. 992 (1919); cf. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S.
29, 80 S. Ct. 503, 4 L.Ed.2d 505 (1960). Under Colgate, the manufacturer
can announce its resale prices in advance and refuse to deal with those who fail
to comply. And a distributor is free to acquiesce in the manufacturer's demand in
order to avoid termination. 1
2
This passage should be contrasted with the qualified acceptance which the Court
gave the Colgate doctrine in Parke, Davis.14" A conclusion that may be drawn
from the Spray-Rite dicta is that a supplier may lawfully coerce compliance with
RPM by threats of termination because no agreement would be present. In a
later footnote, the Court drew a distinction between coerced acquiescence, not
resulting in an agreement, and acquiescence confirmed in a communication
requested by the supplier. 4 Under this view of the Colgate doctrine, a supplier
may threaten a distributor with termination if it fails to comply with the sup-
plier's resale price schedule. The distributor may unwillingly comply with the
supplier's demands and tell the supplier that it will comply. No agreement
arises so long as the supplier has not asked the distributor to communicate its
acquiescence. By approving of this result the Court has resurrected the Colgate
doctrine in its most pristine form.
The Spray-Rite dicta addressed both the distributor-initiated and the supplier-
initiated scenarios. In the distributor-initiated scenario, the Court stated that
evidence that a supplier responded to distributor complaints in terminating a
second distributor is not sufficient standing alone to support the inference of
a conspiracy. In the supplier-initiated scenario, the Court rejuvenated the Colgate
doctrine in an extreme form.
The striking aspect of the Spray-Rite Court's approach is that the Court
reached conclusions about conspiracy issues without an analysis of what char-
acteristics distinguish concerted conduct from individual action within the mean-
ing of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Such an analysis would have allowed the
Court to formulate meaningful conclusions about these issues based upon the
reason for the conspiracy requirement. The remainder of this paper sets forth
an analysis of the concerted action requirement of section I and concludes,
first, that the Colgate doctrine should be rejected and, second, that the situations
142. Id. at 1469 (emphasis supplied).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 98-110.
144. Id. at 1471 n.9.
The concept of a "meeting of the minds" or "a common scheme" in a distributor-
termination case includes more than a showing that the distributor conformed to the sug-
gested price. It means as well that evidence must be presented both that the distributor
communicated its acquiescence or agreement, and that this was sought by the manufacturer.
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where an inference of concerted action between a supplier and a complaining
distributor is appropriate can be defined on a principled basis.
Section II will set forth a test for the existence of an agreement under
section 1 of the Sherman Act and examine that test in several horizontal contexts
in order to assess its validity. Section III will apply the test to the supplier-
initiated and distributor-initiated scenarios. Section IV will attempt to explain
why the Spray-Rite dicta reaches the conclusions it does regarding vertical agree-
ment issues. This explanation is based on the current controversy over the per
se illegality of RPM. Case law suggests a test that could identify concerted
action.
II. THE TEST FOR CONCERTED ACTION
A. Copperweld and Theatre Enterprises Suggest a Test
Shortly after deciding Spray-Rite, the Supreme Court handed down an opin-
ion analyzing the foundation of the concerted action requirement of section 1.145
The Court overturned a long-standing doctrine that would have upheld a finding
of conspiracy because it was not supported by that foundation. In Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. ,146 the Court addressed the issue of "whether
a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary are legally capable of
conspiring with each other under § 1 of the Sherman Act.' ' 47 Earlier decisions




-The Copperweld Court considered the reasons for the distinction drawn by
the Sherman Act between unilateral and concerted conduct. The Court noted
at the outset that to allow vigorous competition, the Sherman Act proscribed
unilateral conduct only when such activity achieved or approached a monop-
oly.' 49 The Court then explained the stricter scrutiny applied to concerted con-
duct reflected Congress' concern that such conspiracies would diminish diversity
in the directions in which economic power flows by eliminating separate centers
of decisionmaking. 150
145. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2734.
148. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968); Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagrams & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Timkin Roller Bearing
Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
149. 104 S. Ct. at 2740.
In part because it is sometimes difficult to distinguish robust competition from conduct
with long-run anti-competitive effects, Congress authorized Sherman Act scrutiny of single
firms only when they pose a danger of monopolization. Judging unilateral conduct in this
manner reduces the risk that the antitrust laws will dampen the competitive zeal of a single
aggressive entrepreneur.
Id.
150. Id. at 2741.
The reason Congress treated concerted behavior more strictly than unilateral behavior
is readily appreciated. Concerted activity inherently is fraught with anticompetitive risk.
It deprives the marketplace of the independent centers of decision-making that competition
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Thus, the goal of the conspiracy requirement is to allow section 1 scrutiny
of challenged conduct only when the market has been deprived "of the inde-
pendent centers of decisionmaking that competition assumes and demands.
' ' ,'
This group behavior receives stricter scrutiny because of the greater danger to
competition. Individual behavior is subject to the relatively permissive standards
of section 2 of the Sherman Act,' 5 2 while group behavior is examined under
more rigorous rule of reason and per se standards of section 1. The test for
whether "independent centers of decisionmaking" have been maintained is
whether the actors have "pursued their own interests separately."'' 5'
The Court previously applied the "independent decision making" and "sep-
arate interests" standard in Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing
Corp.' s4 An operator of a motion picture theatre alleged that motion picture
producers and distributors had conspired to deny it first-run motion pictures.
The plaintiff, whose theatre operated in outlying Baltimore, Maryland, alleged
that the defendant producers and distributors conspired to license first-run mo-
tion pictures only to theatres located in downtown Baltimore. This action limited
the plaintiff to subsequent runs. Plaintiff put on no direct evidence of an agree-
ment among the defendants. The plaintiff argued nevertheless a conspiracy could
be inferred because all of the defendants acted in the same way: all refused to
license first-run pictures to plaintiff. The jury rejected plaintiff's argument and
returned a verdict for the defendants. On appeal, the plaintiff contended that
the evidence of identical action by the defendants compelled a finding of con-
spiracy.
Presaging Copperweld, the Court couched the issue in terms of independence
of decisionmaking in determining whether an agreement, tacit or express, ex-
isted.' 55 The Court reasoned that identical conduct, while probative, was not
assumes and demands. In an)' conspiracy, two or more entities that previously pursued
their own interests separately are combining to act as one for their common benefit. This
not only reduces the diverse directions in which economic power is aimed but suddenly
increases the economic power moving in one particular direction. Of course, such mergings
of resources may well lead to efficiencies that benefit consumers, but their anticompetitive
potential is sufficient to warrant scrutiny even in the absence of incipient monopoly.
Id.
151. Id.
152. 15 U.S.C. S 2 (1982).
153. 104 S. Ct. at 2741; set also Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U S. 208, 222
(1939) (the Court noted that alleged conspirators each engaged in conduct which was to their
advantage only if almost all participated).
The O'Donnell letter named on its face as addressees the eight local representatives of
the distributors, and so from the beginning each of the distributors knew that the proposals
were under consideration by the others. Each was aware that all were in active competition
and that without substantially unanimous action with respect to the restrictions for any
given territory there was risk of a substantial loss of the business and good will of the
subsequent-run and independent exhibitors, but that with it there was the prospect of
increased profits.
Id.
154. 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
155. Id. at 540. "The crucial question is whether respondents' conduct toward petitioner stemmed
from independent decision or from an agreement, tacit or express." Id.
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dispositive.'5 6 Turning to a "separate interests" analysis, the Court found the
critical question was whether in refusing to license first-run pictures to the
plaintiff, each defendant chose conduct in its own self interest regardless of the
actions of the other defendants. The defendants presented evidence that down-
town theatres could draw a larger audience and thereby generate more revenue
for first-run pictures. This evidence supported the inference that in choosing
downtown theatres for first-run pictures, each defendant maximized its own
benefit regardless of the conduct of other defendants. As a result, the Court
found sufficient evidence to uphold the jury verdict. 15 7 Thus, in Theatre Enterprises
as in Copperweld the Court established an "independent decisionmaking" stand-
ard for separating group conduct from individual behavior. It measured this
independence by evaluating the extent to which the actors' conduct maximized
their self-interest regardless of the conduct of others."
An example outside the business context demonstrates this analysis. If two
people, A and B, are observed leaving the same house at the same time, one
may ask whether their conduct is concerted or individual. Two contrasting cases
demonstrate that the answer depends on further facts. In the first case, A is
an armed felon who is using B as a hostage and a shield in leaving the house,
which is surrounded by police. The conduct of A and B would be viewed as
concerted. A's act of leaving the house maximizes his self-interest only because
of B's conduct in acting as a shield. Similarly, B's act of leaving the house
under very dangerous circumstances maximizes his self-interest only because of
A's act of threatening his life if he refuses.. This case demonstrates that two
actors' conduct may be concerted even though their acts are not identical and
one actor is coerced into acting.
In the second case, A and B are both innocent parties who leave the house
because it is on fire. Their conduct is individual not concerted. Leaving a
burning house maximizes the self-interest of each actor regardless of the conduct
of the other, even if A and B have communicated to each other their intent
to leave the building. Further, their conduct remains individual even if one
actor would not have acted absent communication from the other actor. For
156. To be sure, business is admissible circumstantial evidence from which the fact
finder may infer agreement. But this Court has never held that proof of parallel business
behavior conclusively establishes agreement or, phrased differently, that such behavior itself
constitutes a Sherman Act offense. Circumstantial evidence of consciously parallel behavior
may have made heavy inroads into the traditional judicial attitude toward conspiracy; but
"conscious parallelism" has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely.
Id. at 540-41 (citations and footnote omitted).
157. Id. at 541-42.
Here each of the respondents had denied the existence of any collaboration and in addition
had introduced evidence of the local conditions surrounding the [plaintiff's] operation which,
they contended, precluded it from being a successful first-run house. They also attacked
the good faith of the guaranteed offers of the petitioner for first-run pictures and attributed
uniform action to individual business judgment motivated by thb desire for maximum
revenue. This evidence, together with other testimony of an explanatory nature, raised
fact issues requiring the trial judge to submit the issue of conspiracy to the jury.
Id.
158. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra, note 51, at 99 n.17.
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example, assume A is asleep when the fire breaks out and B wakes him up
and tells him about the fire. When A and B then both leave the burning house,
their acts of leaving are individual rather than concerted actions because each
maximizes his individual self-interest by leaving regardless of the conduct of
the other. Even though A would not have acted but for the communication
from B waking him up, the pair's conduct in leaving the building is not con-
certed. Leaving is in each actor's individual self-interest. The test is not based
merely on communication or causation or a combination of both. When either
actor A or B engages in conduct that is in his own self-interest regardless of
the conduct of the other, he is acting individually, not as a part of a group.
In the business context, self-interest can be defined as profit maximization.
The test for concerted action can thus be phrased as follows: conduct is con-
certed for purposes of section 1 if its profit maximizing nature depends upon
the conduct of others, that is similarly dependent. '" This test requires more
than causation because it is not sufficient that an actor's conduct depends upon
the conduct of other actors. The profit maximizing nature of the conduct must
also be dependent. For example, A's act of leaving the burning house was
dependent on B's act of waking him up. However, the profit maximizing nature
of A's act was not so dependent.
As the examples illustrate, a test exists which can determine concerted action.
The Court's statements about the Colgate doctrine and inferences of concerted
behavior in the context of complaining distributors must be measured against
this test. First, however, the viability of the dependence test itself must be
measured.
B. Testing the Test
To assess the effectiveness of the dependence test in determining the existence
of concerted action, this subsection will apply it in contexts (1) where concerted
action either clearly does or does not exist to see if the test would lead to the
same finding, and (2) where there is disagreement over whether concerted action
exists to see if the test is consistent with the approach used by more than one
side to the dispute.
1. Cartels
Naked price fixing by a cartel is clearly illegal under section 1 of the Sher-
man Act.'"" Therefore, if the dependence test is viable, it must lead to a finding
of concerted action when applied to cartels. In forming a cartel, firms which
would otherwise compete attempt to imitate a monopolist by collectively re-
ducing output and raising prices above the competitive level.'"' Because firms
in a purely competitive market are small relative to the total size of the market,
each individual firm cannot substantially affect total market quantity or market
159. Cf. Turner, supra note 94, at 683-84; Comment, Conscious Parallelism and Price Fixing
Defining the Boundary, 52 U. Cmi. L. REV. 508, 522 (1985).
160. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
161. For a basic discussion of competition, monopoly and cartels, see H. HOVENKAMP, supra
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price. A firm in such a market continues to increase its production until its
marginal cost of production equals price. Any move by such a firm to uni-
laterally hold its production below this point would be irrational because the
firm would forego sales on which revenue would exceed cost. Further, the move
would not increase ihe market price.
A monopolist is in a different position. Unlike the firm in a perfectly com-
petitive market, a monopolist controls the total market quantity and its output
decisions do affect price. When a monopolist decides how much to produce, it
does not compare its marginal cost of production to a constant price. Instead
it recognizes that market price will vary depending upon what quantity is pro-
duced. A monopolist may therefore hold its quantity short of the point where
the marginal cost of producing goods equals price to gain the advantage of an
increased price on the quantity it does produce. In short, a monopolist max-
imizes profits by restricting output short of competitive levels thereby raising
price.
A cartel composed of all the firms in an otherwise competitive market can,
through cooperation, imitate a monopolist. Each can agree to restrict production
to increase prices above competitive levels. This, however, subjects a cartel
member to conflicting incentives. The cartel is like a monopolist because the
group collectively has monopoly power and the group's profits will be maximized
by collectively restricting production. A collective increase in quantity will reduce
price. However, each cartel member is a small firm compared to the total size
of the market. Like a firm in a competitive market, its individual output de-
cisions do not have a significant effect on price. Because the cartel has raised
the market price above marginal costs, an individual firm can increase its profits
by reducing its price slightly below the cartel price and substantially expanding
its quantity. Of course, if many firms engaged in this price-cutting strategy,
market quantity would substantially increase, prices would decrease, and the
cartel would eventually collapse. Thus, each firm is subject to the tension created
by the rewards available from maintaining the cartel price and the rewards
available by cheating on the cartel price and risking the cartel's collapse.
A finding of concerted action results when the dependence test for concerted
action under section 1 is applied to firms that join a cartel and comply with
its price agreement. Such a cartel member produces only the quantity that it
can sell at the cartel price. The member does not shave its price slightly to
make further sales at prices that exceed its marginal costs. In choosing to forego
the profits available by beating the cartel price, cartel members are opting
instead for the profits derived from the continuing operation of the cartel. The
profit maximizing nature of this action depends upon other members of the
cartel restricting their output and maintaining the cartel price. The production
and pricing decisions of each cartel member are similarly dependent. Thus,
application of the dependence test demonstrates that an operating cartel is the
product of concerted action.
note 51, SS 1.1, 1.2 & 4.1, and R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOx, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC
NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS 4-11, 96-98 (1981).
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2. Suggested Prices - Vertical and Horizontal
One apparent inconsistency in the antitrust law is the disparate treatment
of suggested prices in the horizontal and vertical contexts. The dependence test
for the existence of a conspiracy explains this difference in treatment.' 62 In the
horizontal context, if one competitor suggests a price to another competitor who
voluntarily accepts the suggested price, the two competitors would be held to
have engaged in an illegal conspiracy to fix prices. However, if a supplier
suggests a resale price to its distributor who voluntarily accepts the suggested
resale price, no section 1 violation has occurred. Professor Sullivan views this
difference in treatment as anomalous and incorrect.' 6' This difference in treat-
ment may be viewed as a mischievous result of the Colgate doctrine. Reliance
on the Colgate doctrine is not necessary, however, because the dependence test
explains the difference.
A distributor voluntarily chooses a price because it believes the price will
maximize its profits. In coming to this conclusion, the distributor must assess
consumer demand for the product, or more specifically, how much of the prod-
uct consumers will demand at different prices. The supplier may provide this
information about demand. In suggesting a resale price, the supplier offers its
view of consumer demand. When the distributor voluntarily accepts the resale
price suggested by the supplier, the distributor's act depends upon the act of
the supplier in a causation sense. The two acts are causally connected in that
the distributor might not have charged the suggested price but for the infor-
mation about consumer demand inherent in the suggestion. Mere causation,
however, does not satisfy the dependence test. To satisfy the dependence test,
the profit maximizing nature of the distributor's act of voluntarily charging the
162. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 397 (1977). Professor Sullivan set
forth the apparent inconsistency in his treatise.
While horizontal action tantamount in purpose and effect to price fixing has been char-
acterized as price fixing and held to be per se unlawful, this approach has not been applied
to vertical contexts. The most obvious example is the widely used practice of manufacturers
announcing "suggested" retail prices for their products. So long as nothing more is done,
the practice is uniformly regarded as lawful; indeed, unless it is to be frankly overruled,
Colgate demands at least this. But universal accepiance of the position does not make it
consistent with that taken about horizontal restraints. Socony-Vacuum instructs that any effort
to "tamper" with the free working of the price system is per se unlawful. When horizontal
restraint is in contemplation these dicta are scrupulously respected. Surely a "suggested"
price program which is horizontal in inception and application would violate the law. Yet
suggested resale prices are countenanced although the manufacturer can have only one
purpose - to affect the price at which dealers resell. Though dealers may or may not
universally follow them, surely suggested prices "tend" either to "stabilize" prices at the
level selected by the manufacturer or to establish that level as the base price from which
discounts are computed. If the law as to vertical restraints were wholly consistent with
that as to horizontal restraints, suggested resale prices would be per se unlawful.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Regarding the lawful nature of suggested prices in the vertical context, see DEVELOPMENTS, supra
note 34, at 60-62, and ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 2, VERTICAL RESTRICTIONS
LIMITING INTRABRAND COMPETITION 73-74 (1977).
163. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 162, at 399.
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suggested price must depend upon the supplier's price suggestion. The profit
maximizing character of the distributor's act of charging the suggested price
depends only on consumer demand, not on the supplier's price suggestion. The
suggested price would have the same maximizing effect on the distributor's
profits regardless of whether the distributor chose it because it was suggested
by the supplier or because of the distributor's own assessment of consumer
demand. Therefore, the application of the dependence test is consistent with
the law's conclusion that a distributor does not violate section 1 by voluntarily
accepting a resale price suggested by the supplier.
164
The dependence test is also consistent with finding a conspiracy based on
a suggestion that affects prices in the horizontal context. If one competitor
suggests a price to another competitor and the second competitor accepts the
suggested price, the dependence test finds a conspiracy. Price suggestion can
maximize the profits of the first competitor only if the second competitor accepts
the price or allows the suggestion to affect its pricing behavior. The profit
maximizing character of the second competitor's act of accepting the suggested
price depends upon the first competitor also accepting the price or allowing the
suggestion to affect its pricing behavior.1 6 5 Therefore, the dependence test is
consistent with the current disparate treatment of suggested prices in the vertical
and horizontal contexts.
3. Oligopoly Pricing
An oligopoly exists in a market when a few firms control a large share of
the total output. Oligopolies differ from monopolies because no single firm has
monopoly power. Oligopolies also differ from competitive markets because each
each oligopolist is large enough that its production decisions can affect the
market price.'"
The existence of an oligopoly in a market raises special concerns under
section 1. First, creation and maintenance of an express cartel is simplified in
an oligopolistic market.' 67 When only a few firms are needed to achieve mo-
nopoly power, the coordination and compliance burdens of the cartel are greatly
reduced. Cartels composed of oligopolists can agree on a cartel price and detect
cheaters more easily because only a few large firms are involved. Therefore,
an effective cartel is more likely in an oligopolistic market than in a competitive
market.
The more perplexing problem created by the existence of an oligopoly is
whether the oligopolists violate section 1 if they raise prices above competitive
levels without ever forming an express cartel. 168 A traditional cartel is based
164. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES, 720 (3rd ed. 1981) ("In
the absence of an express agreement or coercion, acquiescent dealers may simply be persuaded of
the independent merits of following their supplier's suggestion about price .... ").
165. The application of the dependence test to horizontal price suggestions is analogous to its
application to cartels, see supra, text at S II.B.1, and to oligopoly pricing, see infra, text at S II.B.3.
166. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 162, at 331.
167. See R. POSNER, supra note 47, at 52.
168. Regarding oligopoly pricing, see F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECO-
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on a communicated agreement to charge a price above the competitive level.
Oligopolists may be able to keep prices above the competitive level, however,
without a traditional communicated agreement. An oligopolist, closely moni-
toring the conduct of its fellow competitors and anticipating their reactions to
changes in price and output, may choose a higher price and lower output
without express agreement. 69
If oligopolists engage in such supra-competitive pricing, an issue is raised
as to whether they have violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. Two sides of
this oligopoly pricing debate can be compared by examining the divergent po-
sitions of Judge Posner and Professor Turner. When oligopolists restrict output
and raise prices above the competitive level, Posner would find a section 1
violation even if no communicated agreement is proven.'7 " Turner, in contrast,
would not find a violation."' While they reach dramatically different conclusions,
both approaches share one characteristic of importance. They are both consistent
with the dependence test for the existence of a conspiracy.
When the dependence test is applied to supra-competitive oligopolistic pric-
ing, it finds concerted action. An oligopolist's act of reducing output and raising
its prices above competitive levels will maximize its profits only if the other
firms also reduce output and increase prices. If the other firms do not do so,
the higher priced firm will lose sales and profits. Thus, the profit maximizing
nature of each firm's conduct depends upon the conduct of the other firms in
similarly restricting output and raising prices. None of the large firms could
NOMIC PERFORMANCE ch. 5 (2d ed. 1980); L. SULLIVAN, supra note 162, ch. 4; H. HOVENKAMP,
supra note 51, § 4.2; R. POSNER,, supra note 47, ch. 4; Turner, supra note 94, at 657-84; Elzinga,
New Developments on the Cartel Front, 29 ANTITRUST BULL. 3 (1984).
169. P. AREEDA, supra note 164, at 272.
Interdependent decision-making can produce the same unhappy results as monopoly Sup-
pose, for example, a market was made up of five similar one-plant firms with similar costs
and sales. If a monopolist with those five plants would maximize profits at a particular
price x, would the oligopolists charge any less? Firm Alpha, eager to lower its price
somewhat in order to expand its sales, knows that the other four firms would probably
reduce their prices too and thus maintain their pre-existing market shares. Unless Alpha
believes that it can conceal its price reduction for a time or otherwise gain a substantial
advantage from being the first to move, the price reduction would merely reduce its profits.
Such "oligopolistic rationality" can not only forestall rivalous price reductions, it can also
provide for price increases through, for example, price leadership. If the price had, for
some reason, been less than x, firm Beta might announce price x to be effective immediately
or in several days or next season. The other four firms may each choose to follow Beta's
lead; if they do not increase their prices to Beta's level, it will reduce its price to their
level.
Id. (footnote omitted). Areeda notes that this scenario relies upon simplifying assumptions.
Caveat. This simple model is meant to illustrate an important phenomenon about markets
inhabited by a few firms. It does not purport to describe any real market, since "oli-
gopolists" behave in complicated ways in responding to varying cost and market conditions.
And note that while price is likely to be higher when there are fewer firms than when
there are very many, we cannot predict whether an oligopoly's output and price will
approach competitive or monopoly levels.
Id. (citation omitted).
170. See R. POSNER, supra note 47, at 39-77.
171. See Turner, supra note 94, at 657-73.
[Vol. XXXVII
VERTICAL AGREEMENTS UNDER S1 OF SHERMAN ACT
keep prices up if others did not go along. 7 2 Thus, the dependence test is met. 7 3
By applying the dependence test to supra-competitive oligopolistic pricing
one may conclude that concerted action exists for purposes of section 1. This
conclusion is consistent with Posner's view that such pricing violates section 1.
According to Posner, oligopolistic pricing is alone sufficient to show a conspiracy
because the mutual forbearance required is similar to a unilateral contract rec-
ognized at common law. 74 Thus, both Posner and the dependence test would
find concerted action in supra-competitive oligopolistic pricing.
Turner would, not treat mere supra-competitive oligopolistic pricing as illegal
under section 1. While he raises the possibility that this result might be justified
on the ground of lack of an agreement, he ultimately rejects this rationale. 75
Instead, he acknowledges that such pricing should be viewed as creating an
agreement, but should be treated as lawful for reasons unrelated to the presence
or absence of an agreement. 7 6 Turner uses a dependency analysis to find an
172. If prices are at a supra-competitive level for some reason other than the coordinated
action of the oligopolists (such as a drop in demand), the oligopolists would be able to maintain
prices at the level only by reducing output. The reduction in output to maintain a supra-competitive
price would be analogous to a reduction in output to create such a price and would be subject to
the dependence test on the same basis described in the text.
173. The application of the dependence test to supra-competitive oligopolistic pricing is anal-
ogous to its application to cartels, see supra text at 5 II.B.1, and to horizontal price suggestions,
see supra text at 5 II.B.2.
174. R. POSNER, supra note 47, at 71-72.
If the economic evidence introduced in a case warrants an inference of collusive pricing,
there is neither legal nor practical justification for requiring evidence that will support the
further inference that the collusion was explicit rather than tacit. Certainly from an eco-
nomic standpoint it is a detail whether the collusive pricing scheme was organized and
implemented in such a way as to generate evidence of actual communications.
The language of section 1 of the Sherman Act, though confined to restraints of trade
impbsed by "contract, combination . . ., or conspiracy," is not an obstacle to the suggested
approach. There is no distortion of accepted meanings in viewing tacit collusion as a form
of concerted rather than unilateral activity. If seller A restricts his output in the expectation
that B will do likewise, and B restricts his output in a like expectation, there is a literal
meeting of the minds, a mutual understanding, even if there is no overt communication.
In forbearing to seek short-term gains at each other's expense in order to reap monopoly benefits that
only such mutual forbearance will allow, A and B are like the parties to a "unilateral contract,"
which is treated by the law as concerted rather than individual behavior. If someone
advertises in a newspaper that he will pay $10 to the person who finds and returns his
dog, anyone who meets the condition has an enforceable claim against him to the promised
reward. The finder's action in complying with the specified condition is all the indication
of assent that the law requires for a binding contract. Tacit collusion is similar: one seller
communicates his "offer" by restricting output, and the offer is "accepted" by the actions
of his rivals in restricting their outputs as well. I am arguing simply that it may be
appropriate in some cases to instruct a jury to find an agreement to fix prices if it is
satisfied that there was a tacit meeting of the minds of the defendants on maintaining a
noncompetitive pricing policy.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
175. But see Markovits, A Response to Professor Posner, 28 STAN. L. REv. 919, 933-35 (1976)
(characterizing Turner's view on the presence of an agreement based on supra-competitive oligo-
polistic pricing as ambiguous).
176. Turner, supra note 94, at 671-72.
I conclude, then, that oligopolists who take into account the probable reactions of
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agreement. Because the actions are interdependent an agreement exists.
'77
III. APPLYING THE TEST
This section applies the dependence test for a conspiracy to supplier-dis-
tributor conduct. First the supplier-initiated scenario, where a distributor com-
plies with the wishes of its supplier because of a perceived threat of termination,
competitors in setting their basic prices, without more in the way of "agreement" than
is found in "conscious parallelism," should not be held unlawful conspirators under the
Sherman Act even though, as in American Tobacco, they refrain from competing in price.
As a legal conclusion, this could be stated in either of two ways: (1) there is no violation
because there is no "agreement"; or (2) there is no violation because, although there is
"agreement," the agreement cannot properly be called an unlawful agreement. Either way
of formulating the result is supportable. Nevertheless, while there are arguable grounds
for saying there is no agreement, there are far better grounds for saying that though there
may be "agreement" it is not unlawful agreement. The latter superficially is more difficult
to maintain, for if there is agreement it involves "price fixing." But as the discussion
indicated, and as the discussion below of such related matters as price systems may indicate
more sharply, the main grounds for absolving the behavior have little to do with the
question whether agreement is involved. Moreover, the difficulty with the "no agreement"
rationale is that the conduct seems equally well described as being an agreement, and the
semantics of these terms seem intrinsically incapable of a satisfactory resolution of the
question. For me, this is a fatal difficulty, and compels the conclusion that the only
convincing rationale for absolving oligopoly pricing rests on other grounds.
Id. For an interesting discussion consistent with Turner's view, see, Carstensen, Commentary: Re-
flections on Hay, Clark, and the Relationship of Economic Analysis and Policy to Rules of Antztrust, 1983
Wis. L. REV. 953 (commenting upon Hay, Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly, and Antitrust Law, 67 CORNELL
L. REV. 439 (1982), and Clark, Price-Fixing Without Collusion: An Antitrust Analysis of Facilitating
Practices After Ethyl Corp., 1983 Wis. L. REv. 887).
177. In accepting the conclusion that supra-competitive oligopolistic pricing constitutes an agree-
ment under § 1, Turner uses a dependence test.
The substance of the analysis and contentions made so far may be summarized as
follows:
(1) Conscious parallelism is meaningless, and in no way indicates agreement, in the
absence of some evidence indicating that the parallel decisions of the alleged conspirators
were contrary, on the hypothesis of independent individual decision, to their apparent
individual self-interest.
(2) Conscious parallelism contains no element of agreement where what is involved is
simply the independent responses of a group of competitors to the same set of facts,
"independent" decisions meaning a decision that would have been taken regardless of what
competitors decided to do.
(3) Conscious parallelism may reasonably be said to involve an element of agreement
where the decisions of each competitor are dependent upon the others making the same
decision, and where (as is virtually certain to be the case) the situation is other than that
of a near-monopoly firm or of a perfectly symmeirical oligopoly.
Turner, supra note 94, at 681. Turner goes on to comment favorably about the use of dependence
as a general test for the existence of concerted action under S 1.
I also find considerable appeal, as a general matter, in defining "agreement" for
purposes of Sherman Act law in terms of interdependence of decisions, if for no other
reason than that it seems to me to be a clearer and more workable standard than any
other standard, of acceptable scope, which requires something more. Once one goes beyond
the boundaries of explicit, verbally communicated assent to a common course of action -
a step long since taken and from which it would not seem reasonable to retreat - it is
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will be examined. The Colgate doctrine addresses this scenario. Then, the dis-
tributor-initiated scenario, where a supplier responds to a distributor's com-
plaints about a rival by terminating the second distributor, will be analyzed.
A. The Supplier-Initiated Scenario - The Colgate Doctrine Fails the Test.
The Spray-Rite dicta resurrected the Colgate doctrine in its most expansive
form. That Court stated that concerted action does not exist even though a
distributor maintains resale prices announced by the supplier only to avoid
termination.'7 8 This pristine version of the Colgate doctrine, under which a sup-
plier may coerce distributor compliance with its demands, must be measured
against the dependence test.
The dependence test raises two issues about the conduct of the distributor
and the supplier. First, does the profit-maximizing nature of the distributor's
act of compliance depend upon the suppliei's acts of coercion? The answer to'
this question is affirmative where the Colgate doctrine applies. A distributor sets
its price at a level designed to maximize its profits. When it does so without
any input from the supplier, or voluntarily in response to the supplier's sug-
gestion,'7 9 concerted action does not exist. In the Colgate doctrine scenario, how-
ever, the distributor sets- its prices at the level demanded by the supplier only
because of threats of termination. Except for the supplier's threats, the dis-
tributor w6uld have set its prices at a different, profit-maximizing level. In
complying with the supplier's demands, the distributor is still attempting to
maximize its profits. The distributor accepts the resale price level demanded
by the supplier to avoid the costs that would flow from the threatened ter-
mination. Therefore, the profit-maximizing nature of charging the price de-
manded by the supplier depends upon the supplier's demand and threat of
termination. Except for the supplier's demand and threat, the distributor would
choose different profit-maximizing price levels. Thus, the profit-maximizing na-
ture of the distributor's act depends upon the supplier's conduct.
The second issue raised by the dependence test is whether the profit-max-
imizing nature of the supplier's conduct similarly depends on the distributor's
conduct. The supplier's imposition of resale prices through a policy of termi-
nating non-complying distributors has costs. Substantial administrative costs arise
in developing and enforcing such a program. Further, some crtherwise efficient
and, therefore, desirable distributors probably will be terminated or voluntarily
will cease to do business with a supplier who imposes price restrictions. Other
distributors will never commence dealing with the supplier. In the Colgate scen-
ario, the resale price demanded by the supplier is not the price that each
distributor would have independently selected. Faced with the supplier's de-
mands, presumably some distributors would rather risk termination by failing
to comply or will voluntarily switch to another supplier or product.
extraordinarily difficult if not impossible to define clearly a plausible limit short of inter-
dependence.
Id. at 683.
178. 104 S. Ct. at 1469.
179. See supra text at S II.B.2.
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The supplier must perceive some benefits that will outweigh these costs.
The only potential source of these benefits is the compliance of the distributors.
Proponents of RPM would say that these benefits flow from services that dis-
tributors will be induced to supply.5"" Even if the supplier is using RPM as
an enforcement tool of a distributor or supplier cartel, or is acting upon some
other anticompetitive motive, that supplier must expect to gain sufficient benefits
from compliance to outweigh the costs of its conduct. Thus, the profit-maxi-
mizing nature of the supplier's policy of terminating distributors who do not
comply. with its announced resale prices depends upon the distributors' com-
pliance. In this circumstance, the dependence test is satisfied by the conduct
of both the supplier and the distributor."' Applying the dependence test leads
to the conclusion that concerted action exists when the supplier coerces com-
pliance with its wishes by threats of termination, a conclusion which is contrary
to the Colgate doctrine as set forth in the Spray-Rite decision.
B. The Distributor-Initiated Scenario - Applying the Dependence Test
I in the Complaining Distributor Context
Applying the dependence test to the distributor-initiated scenario requires a
determination of whether concerted action exists when a supplier terminates a
distributor in response to complaints by one or more other distributors. The
first issue that must be addressed is whether the profit-maximizing nature of
the supplier's termination depends upon the distributor's complaint. The de-
pendence test leads to a finding of concerted action only if this is the case.
The key to analyzing this issue is recalling that the dependence test requires
more than mere causation.
Possibly the distributor's complaint only has a causal relationship with the
termination. The distributor's complaint may have merely provided the supplier
with otherwise unavailable information about the terminated distributor's con-
duct.'1 2 If the supplier believes that its profits will be enhanced if it refuses to
deal with distributors that engage in the reported conduct, it will terminate the
offending distributor. The complaint caused the termination because, but for
the complaint, the supplier would not have known about the terminated dis-
tributor's conduct. However, the first step in the dependence test is not satisfied.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 51-63.
181. The analysis set forth in the text applies even if the supplier does not expressly threaten
discounting distributors with termination. The essential elements are: (1) the distributor maintains
prices at levels different than it would otherwise choose because it perceives a threat of termination
if it fails to do so; and (2) this perception results from the supplier's conduct designed to so impress
the continuing distributors. So long as both of these elements are present, the profit-maximizing
nature of the distributors' conduct depends upon the supplier's conduct and the supplier's conduct
is similarly dependent. For example, distributors may perceive such a threat of termination if a
supplier engages in a series of terminations obviously motivated by the terminated distributor's
pricing practices. See Turner, supra note 94, at 690-91. If a distributor observing the series of
terminations establishes price levels different than those it would otherwise adopt in order to avoid
termination, the dependence test is met and concerted action exists.
182. See Brief Amicus Curiae of National Agricultural Chemicals Association in Support of
Reversal at 7-8, Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984).
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While the termination depends upon the complaint in a causation sense, the
profit-maximizing nature of the supplier's act does not depend upon the com-
plaint. The supplier's reason for the termination is the conduct of the terminated
distributor, not the complaint. The supplier would act in the same way re-
gardless of how it learned of the distributor's conduct.'8 3 If the supplier had
discovered the terminated distributor's conduct through its own employees, it
would still have terminated the distributor. The profit-maximizing nature of the
termination depends upon the terminated distributor's conduct, not upon the
complaint.1 4 Therefore, applying the dependence test would not lead to a con-
clusion of concerted action.'
The relationship between the distributor's complaint and the termination,
however, is not necessarily limited to causation. The profit-maximizing nature
of the supplier's act might depend upon the complaint. The supplier might not
view the terminated distributor's conduct as adversely affecting the supplier's
profits, but rather the supplier might effect the termination to please the com-
plaining distributor. In so doing, the supplier must view pleasing the com-
plaining distributor as a profit-maximizing act. Perhaps the supplier views the
complaining distributor as especially valuable or at least more valuable than
the terminated distributor. The profit-maximizing nature of the supplier's act
of termination depends upon the distributor's complaint, because the fact that
the termination resolves the complaint-is the key element in making the ter-
mination a profit-maximizing act.
The remaining issue is whether the complaining distributor's conduct is
similarly dependent. If the distributor's complaint is a profit-maximizing act
for the distributor, it must be so because of the supplier's anticipated response.
The distributor's complaint could not otherwise affect its profits. Thus, the
profit-maximizing nature of the distributor's complaint depends upon the sup-
plier's response.
In summary, the dependence test does not lead to the conclusion of concerted
conduct if the supplier would have terminated the distributor no matter how
it discovered the distributor's conduct. On the other hand, a finding of concerted
behavior is appropriate under the test if the termination maximizes the supplier's
profits only because it pleases the complaining distributor. The result of the
application of the dependence test in the complaining distributor context depends
183. The supplier in this situation is analogous to the distributor who voluntarily accepts a
suggested resale price. See supra text at S II.B.2. The conduct of each is caused by someone who
has given them information about some external circumstance. However, the profit maximizing
nature of their conduct depends on the external circumstance, not the manner in which they found
out about that circumstance.
184. Obviously, concerted action does not exist between the supplier and the terminated dis-
tributor because the profit-maximizing nature of the terminated distributor's conduct does not
depend upon the supplier's act of termination.
185. As discussed above, a series of such terminations may lead to the perception on the part
of distributors of a threat of termination and that perception may coerce compliance with the
supplier's perceived wishes. In that case, concerted action would exist between the supplier and
the distributors that unwillingly comply. See supra note 181.
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upon whether the supplier is concerned about the terminated distributor's con-
duct or the complaining distributor's complaint.' 6
The conclusions of this section regarding the application of the dependence
test can be summarized as follows:
1. The Colgate doctrine fails the dependence test. A supplier may choose
a course of conduct to create a perception that distributors which do not comply
with its wishes will be terminated. In such a case, a finding of concerted action
between the supplier and the distributors which unwillingly comply is appro-
priate.
2. A supplier may respond to a distributor complaint by terminating the
distributor that is the subject of the complaint. A finding of concerted action
between the supplier and the complaining distributor is appropriate if the sup-
plier effects the termination only to please the complaining distributor.
IV. WHY DOES THE Spray-Rite DICTA ACCEPT THE Colgate DOCTRINE?
The foregoing analysis makes apparent that the conclusions of the depend-
ence test are not consistent with the conclusions of the Spray-Rite dicta. The
Spray-Rite dicta concluded: (I) the Colgate doctrine should be resurrected, and
(2) evidence that a supplier terminated a distributor in response to complaints
by one or more other distributors is not enough to establish concerted action
between the supplier and the complaining distributor(s).'8 7 The dependence test
rejects the first conclusion 8" and defines the "something more" required by
the second.' The dependence test can be viewed as supplementary to the Spray-
Rite dicta's conclusions in the distributor complaint context."' As a result, the
most dramatic difference between the dependence test and the Spray-Rite dicta
is that the dicta accepts the Colgate doctrine while the dependence test rejects
it. This section will explore that difference.
By accepting the Colgate doctrine, the Spray-Rite dicta divides the universe
of RPM into two distinct parts. RPM accomplished by means of express agree-
ments or implied agreements that do not qualify for protection under the Colgate
doctrine is per se illegal. However, RPM accomplished by coercing unwilling
186. If the dependence test leads to the conclusion that the termination was the result of
concerted action between the supplier and the complaining distributor, it is important to ask what
is the nature of the agreement? The Court must determine whether the agreement which has been
established is subject to the rule of reason or a per se standard. The agreement between such a
complaining distributor and supplier is at least an agreement to terminate the distributor which is
the subject of the complaint. However, no existing per se rule covers a vertical agreement between
one distributor and its supplier which merely results in a refusal to deal with another distributor.
See Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 133 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978).
However, it is possible to argue that, if the nature of the complaint is that the soon-to-be terminated
distributor is discounting, the complaining distributor is implying that it will not discount. If such
an implied agreement exists, the per se rule against resale price maintenance would presumably
apply.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 134-44.
188. See supra text at 5 III.A.
189. See supra text at § III.B.
190 Id
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compliance with announced resale prices through a policy of terminating dis-
tributors that do not comply is lawful because no agreement is present.'92 This
line between per se illegal RPM and per se legal RPM is not based on the
reasons for the concerted action requirement nor any other identified policy.
In Sylvania, where the Supreme Court faced the issue of what standards
should govern nonprice vertical restrictions, the Court said the resolution of
that issue "must be based upon demonstrable economic effect rather than -
as in Schwinn - upon formalistic line drawing.' ' 92 The same is true for RPM.
No demonstrable economic effect justifies granting legality to RPM coerced by
threats of termination but treating all other forms of RPM as per se unlawful.
Such disparate treatment may be appropriately characterized as "formalistic line
drawing." The incongruous nature of the distinction drawn by the Spray-Rite
dicta will be obvious to any lawyer who must explain it to a client. The client
must be told that it is legal to threaten distributors with termination if they
do not comply with the supplier's announced resale prices and to terminate
noncomplying distributors. However, the client must be informed that it is per
se illegal to ask distributors to comply with those same prices and seek and
receive assurances that they will do so.193 The client will correctly perceive no
relevant difference between RPM achieved by these two means.'9
The Supreme Court's endorsement, albeit in dicta, of the foregoing dis-
tinction is unsupportable. Perhaps the Court's embrace of the Colgate doctrine
results from the tension created by the different treatment accorded nonprice
vertical restrictions and RPM. The Court may be uncomfortable with the per
se illegality currently applied to RPM and may be attempting to create a
"safety-valve" by which some RPM will be allowed. While such a rationale
does not justify creating a distinction that does not implement the Court's
underlying economic rationale, there is a parallel example.
In Schwinn, the Court ruled that nonprice vertical restrictions were per se
illegal in sale for resale transactions. 95 However, after describing nonprice ver-
tical restrictions as "obviously destructive of competition," the Court held them
exempt from per se illegality if they were accomplished by a consignment, rather
than a sale for resale. 96 This exemption from per se illegality was necessary,
in the Court's view, to allow procompetitive nonprice vertical restrictions.'
97
191. See Spray-Rite, 104 S. Ct. at 1469.
192. 433 U.S. at 59.
193. 104 S. Ct. at 1471 n.9.
194. Professor Levi was correctly troubled by the effect which the Colgate doctrine would have
on lay persons' views of the law.
It is a matter of concern also that in an area involving important commercial practice the
law should have developed so as to appear to put a premium on the avoidance of words
which describe what the parties clearly intend. This must seem strange and degrading to
men who take pride in their given word, and it fosters a caricatured view of the law.
Levi, supra note 111, at 326.
195. 388 U.S. at 379.
196. Id. at 380.
197. On the other hand.... we are not prepared to introduce the inflexibility which a per
se rule might bring if it were applied to prohibit all vertical restrictions of territory ....
Such a rule might severely hamper smaller enterprises resorting to reasonable methods of
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Thus, the Court in Schwinn established per se illegality for nonprice vertical
restrictions but allowed an exception for such restrictions imposed in consign-
ment relationships. The Court was attempting to permit a mechanism that
allows for procompetitive nonprice vertical restrictions. The problem, of course,
is the distinction that the Court drew between consignments and sales for resale
is irrelevant to the difference between procompetitive and anticompetitive re-
strictions. Both procompetitive and anticompetitive nonprice vertical restrictions
can be accomplished through both sales for resale and consignments. Therefore,
the line that the Court drew had no relationship to the economic policy it was
attempting to further.
The Court recognized this in Sylvania. There, the Court overruled Schwinn
and held that nonprice vertical restrictions are subject to the rule of reason
regardless of whether they are imposed on a sale for resale or a consignment.
After describing the disparate treatment accorded sale and consignment situa-
tions by Schwinn, the Sylvania court criticized the distinction as unrelated to the
competitive effects of vertical restraints." 8
When the Court in Spray-Rite embraces the Colgate doctrine, it may be falling
into the trap that ensnared it in Schwinn. In Schwinn, the Court was uncom-
fortable with the per se illegality it created for nonprice vertical restrictions so
it provided an escape through the rule of reason treatment for consignment
transactions. In Spray-Rite, the Court may be doing the same thing. The Court
may be uncomfortable with per se illegality for RPM and may be attempting
to provide an escape mechanism by granting per se legality to RPM accom-
plished by threats of termination through the Colgate doctrine. Unfortunately,
both the line drawn by the Court in Schwinn and the line drawn in the Spray-
Rite dicta are not based upon the competitive policy that is the foundation of
the Sherman Act. It was this policy which the Court correctly relied upon in
Sylvania to overrule the distinction created in Schwinn. This same policy requires
that the line established by the embrace of the Colgate doctrine in the Spray-
Rite dicta be abolished. If the Court is uncomfortable with per se illegality for
RPM, it should address that issue and establish a rule which is "based upon
demonstrable economic effect rather than - as in Schwinn - upon formalistic
line drawing. ' ' 19
CONCLUSION
This paper adopts a dependence test for the existence of concerted action
for purposes of section 1 of the Sherman Act. This test is supported by the
Copperweld and Theatre Enterprises decisions and is consistent with contemporary
analysis of a diverse range of section 1 issues. The dependence test supplements
meeting the competition of giants and of merchandising through independent dealers, and
it might sharply accelerate the trend toward vertical integration of the distribution process.
Id. at 379-80.
198. 433 U.S. at 54. "The Court's opinion [in Schwinn] provides no analytical support for
these contrasting positions. Nor is there even an assertion in the opinion that the competitive impact
of vertical restrictions is significantly affected by the form of the transaction." Id.
199. Id. at 59.
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the "something more" requirement established by the Court in Spray-Rite for
finding concerted action when a distributor is terminated by its supplier because
of complaints by one or more other distributors. The dependence test also leads
to the rejection of the Colgate doctrine. If the Court is uncomfortable with per
se illegality for resale price maintenance, then it should squarely face that issue.
It should not turn to a formalistic doctrine unrelated to demonstrable economic
effects.
